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This dissertation addresses voters’ information heterogeneity and its effect 
on spatial voting. While most spatial voting models simply assume that voter 
uncertainty about candidate preferences is homogeneus across voters despite 
Downs’ early use of uncertainty scale to classify the electorate, information 
studies have discovered that well and poorly informed citizens have sizeable and 
consistent differences in issue conceptualization, perception, political opinion and 
behavior. Built upon the spatial theory’s early insights on uncertainty and the 
findings of information literature, this dissertation claims that information effects 
should be incorporated into the spatial voting model. By this incorporation, I seek 
 vii
to unify the different scholarly traditions of the spatial theory of voting and the 
study of political information.  
I hypothesize that uncertainty is not homogeneous, b t varies with the 
level of information, which are approximated by political activism as well as 
information on candidate policy positions. To test this hypothesis, I employ 
heteroskedastic probit models that specify heterogeneity of voter uncertainty in 
probabilistic models of spatial voting. The models are applied to the U.S. 
presidential elections in 1992-2004. The empirical results of the analysis strongly 
support the expectation. They reveal that voter uncertainty is heterogeneous as a 
result of uneven distributions of information and political activism even when 
various voting cues are available.  
This dissertation also discovers that this heterogeneity in voter uncertainty 
has a significant effect on electoral outcomes. It finds that the more uncertain a 
voter is about the candidates, the more likely he or she is to vote for the 
incumbent or a better-known candidate. This clearly reflects voters’ risk-averse 
attitudes that reward the candidate with greater certainty, all other things held 
constant. Heterogeneity in voter uncertainty and its electoral consequences, 
therefore, have important implications for candidates' strategies. The findings 
suggest that the voter heterogeneity leads candidates’ equilibrium strategies and 
campaign tactics to be inconsistent with those that sp ial analysts have normally 
proposed. 
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This dissertation addresses information heterogeneity across the electorate 
and its effect on spatial voting. Ever since Converse (1964) disclosed variations in 
the level of ideological constraints among the electorate, public opinion 
researchers have been interested in how voters with varying levels of political 
information make political decisions. They have discovered that the more 
informed and the less informed are different in perception of political agents, 
attitude toward policy issues, political preference and behavior. Because of this 
variation in individuals' decision making process, and the effect of that variation 
on political outcomes, public opinion scholars and democratic theorists have been 
pessimistic about the electoral choice made by the mass electorate, a large 
segment of which is uninformed about and inattentive to politics.  
The spatial theory of voting, however, has shown no interest in 
information heterogeneity and its effect, even if information is a key element of 
spatial voting. An essential assumption of spatial voting is that voters make 
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decisions based on their preferences for candidates’ positions on issues or 
ideology because voters have information on them. Particularly, deterministic 
voting models assume that voters vote unerringly for the candidate whose 
positions are closest to theirs. These models assume that voters have full, perfect 
information on candidates. Probabilistic spatial voting models, however, discard 
that stern assumption as a response to criticisms of it  unreality. They 
acknowledge that voters have limited, incomplete information on candidates who 
they vote for, and admit that voters can and do err when choosing candidates. 
Despite their acceptance of limitations in the information that voters possess, 
however, spatial theorists have no interest in the fact that empirical researchers of 
public opinion have noted: some voters have more information than others and 
this uneven distribution of information has a crucial bearing on electoral 
outcomes. Empirical researchers have shown that more informed voters are more 
likely than less informed voters to conceptualize th  issues they are concerned 
with on an ideological spectrum, and to perceive candidates as being at 
ideologically aligned positions with smaller variations. This dissertation presumes 
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that these differences in their conceptualization and perception of candidates 
make voters heterogeneous in uncertainty about their c o ces. Some voters are 
more certain about their preferences than others, and thus make smaller errors in 
their vote choices. This supposition is a significant challenge to the basic 
assumption of the spatial theory of voting.     
Uncertainty expressed as the error term is a key elem nt of probabilistic 
spatial voting models. The error term, or uncertainty, i dicates “some positive 
probability for choosing a candidate who is not closest to the voter in the 
predictive space (Lin et al 1999: 60).” With probabilistic spatial voting, 
uncertainty is inherent in any election by the mass electorate because of the noisy 
information process, because of candidate-induced ambiguity or because of the 
difficulty of predicting candidates' future policies (Enelow and Hinich 1984). 
However, the degree of uncertainty is assumed to behomogeneous across voters; 
which, I believe, is unrealistic. As long as voters differ in their abilities to acquire 
and process (costly) information, to perceive the ambiguous positions that 
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candidates strategically present and to predict candid tes' real policy changes, 
then uncertainty should vary with those differing abilities.  
It is surprising that the spatial theory of voting is indifferent to information 
heterogeneity and its effects because heterogeneous uncertainty is an important 
issue of the seminal work by Downs (1957), who first introduced the spatial 
theory of voting to political scientists. Downs classified voters and nonvoters 
according to their levels of uncertainty and political activism, and argued that the 
influences of uncertain and certain voters on governm ntal decision-making 
differ. This suggests that heterogeneous uncertainty plays an important role in the 
fledging spatial theory of voting. However, spatial analysts after Downs have 
been unconcerned with information heterogeneity. They simply assume that 
uncertainty, or the error term of the spatial voting model, is a random variable that 
is normally distributed.  
Since the Michigan School scholars revealed that the levels of information 
and issue conceptualization vary across individuals, the topic of uneven 
distribution of information has been dominated by empirical researchers who 
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study elections from behavioral perspectives. This behavioral tradition usually 
presumes that vote choice is swayed by various other motivations than policy 
issues (Erikson and Romero 1990) and this may alienate the spatial analysts from 
the scholarly interest in unevenness of information and its effects, which are still a 
topic of lively interest among behavioral researches. For spatial analysts, the 
issue-oriented electorate is inherently given and voting motivations other than 
issues are considered the disturbances of voter decision making. Given that all 
voters are policy-oriented, non-policy considerations r errors are considered only 
a noise which is an innate characteristic of campaign information. As a matter of 
fact, differently from the scholars of information studies, most spatial analysts are 
quite optimistic about the mass electorate's abilities. They tend to agree that 
individuals can have informed preferences due to various information cues.  
This dissertation stands along the same line as empirical researchers who 
assert that the information cue explanation lacks compelling empirical evidence to 
explain the observed divergences between more and less informed people with 
respect to political perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. By incorporating 
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information effects into the probabilistic model of spatial voting, I seek to unify 
the different scholarly traditions of the spatial theory of voting and the study of 
political information. Based on empirical evidence of information heterogeneity, I 
challenge the spatial voting model's conventional assumption that voter 
uncertainty is randomly distributed. This challenge is actually a resumption of 
Downs’ argument of voter heterogeneity on the uncertainty scale. I hypothesize 
that uncertainty is not homogeneous, but varies with the levels of information, 
which are approximated by political activism as well as information on candidate 
policy positions. To test this hypothesis, I employ heteroskedastic probit models 
that specify information heterogeneity in probabilistic models of spatial voting.  
The models are applied to the U.S. presidential elections in 1992-2004. 
The empirical results of this study imply that heterogeneity in voter uncertainty 
caused by uneven distributions of information and political activism is observed 
even when voting cues other than issue proximity are available. This 
heterogeneity in voter uncertainty has significant effects on electoral outcomes. 
Having a characteristic of risk aversion, American voters are expected to discount 
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candidates with a certain level of uncertainty. Heterogeneity in voter uncertainty 
and its electoral consequences, therefore, have important implications for 
candidates' strategies. The results suggest that the voter heterogeneity leads 
candidates’ or parties’ equilibrium strategies and campaign tactics to be 
inconsistent with what spatial analysts have normally proposed. 
In sum, this dissertation contributes to scholarly interests of both spatial 
voting and information studies particularly by unifying those different scholarly 
traditions. It proposes a spatial theoretical approach to vote choice, which is 
modified on a basis that is more realistic than the conventional spatial voting 
models show. This revision suggests adjusted equilibri m strategies. In addition, 
it also implies an important way that information affects electoral outcomes, 
which even empirical researchers have ignored: through its effect on voter 
uncertainty. This study, therefore, arouses the study of political information to 
notice this important element of voter heterogeneity – heterogeneity in uncertainty 
about candidate preferences – that results in disparities in voters' choices. The 
systematic disparities among voters in voting behavior caused by heterogeneous 
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uncertainty are enough to deserve more attention form both rational politicians 
and researchers of voting behavior.  
Chapter 2 discusses existing literature which motivates the theoretical 
framework of this study. I first define the concept of uncertainty in the framework 
of spatial analysis and discuss why spatial analysts consider uncertainty to be 
homogeneous across individuals. I notice that this assumption of homogeneity is 
supported by the psychologists who assert that heuristic devices can compensate 
for a lack of information. I trace the debate on information effects by contrasting 
this approach and the information literature, and discuss the reason for specifying 
information effects in spatial voting models. I also ook at some spatial theorists 
whose findings propose the significant effect of voter heterogeneity on spatial 
voting. Finally, to examine the electoral consequences of uncertainty, I discuss 
theoretical and the empirical findings inferring the voters’ risk-averse attitudes 
that reward the candidate whose positions are relativ y certain.      
 Chapter 3 discusses this study's methodological appro ches. I argue that 
the standard probit model for voting choice, which assumes equal variance across 
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observations, may yield inconsistent maximum likelihood estimators; and thus 
probit models should specify heteroskedasticity. As an alternative to standard 
probit estimations, I propose a heteroskedastic probit model whose error variance 
is specified by information and political activism. This chapter discusses the 
measurement of spatial proximity for this model's choi e equation, and the 
measurement of information and activism for the variance equation.  
Chapters 4 and 5 explore heterogeneity in voter uncertainty in the 1992-
2004 U.S. presidential elections. As the preliminary analysis for the 
heteroskedastic probit analysis, Chapter 4 examines how differently the more and 
less informed, and the more and less active, conceptualize issues and place 
candidates' positions. This chapter is fundamentally concerned with how this 
discrepancy leads voters to be diverse in their uncertainty about vote choices, 
which is measured here by simple calculations of voting "correctness."   
Chapter 5 contains the results of the heteroskedastic probit analysis. Here I 
present several sets of heteroskedastic probit models to xplore whether 
information cues eliminate either heterogeneity in uncertainty, or the effects of 
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information and activism on uncertainty. Given the results, I examine the 
determinants of voter uncertainty to see which factors make some individuals less 
certain than others. 
Chapter 6 turns to the question of how heterogeneity in voter uncertainty 
affects electoral outcomes. To explore disparities among voters in vote choice, 
this chapter adopts not only a straightforward statistical analysis but also the 
theoretical formulation where the effect of uncertainty on vote choice in the 
heteroskedastic probit model is estimated in a verydirect and simplified way. 
Both the empirical and theoretical analyses focus on whom the voters are more 
likely to vote for, as they become uncertain.  
In Chapter 7, I summarize the empirical findings of this dissertation and 
reach a conclusion about the effect of information heterogeneity on voter 
uncertainty and its implications. Finally, this dissertation concludes by suggesting 
future avenues for research.  
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CHAPTER 2   
Information Heterogeneity and Uncertainty in Elections 
 
2.1  Uncertainty and the Homogeneity Assumption  
 2.1.1 Uncertainty about Candidate Positions 
 As the traditional spatial model of voting assumes that an individual votes 
for the candidate whose issue positions are closest to his/her own positions, it 
normally posits that individuals know candidate positi ns on issues with certainty. 
However, scholars of public opinion have discovered that there is a significant 
degree of uncertainty in the electorate about candidate positions on policy issues. 
Some empirically-oriented scholars even argue that issue proximity may be less 
important than uncertainty about candidate position in electoral choices (Bartels 
1986). While a massive amount of information about the candidates is available 
during campaign periods, incomplete and imperfect presentation of this 
information is inherent to the nature of campaigns. As Downs (1957: 83) 
mentions, persuaders or information sources “provide only those facts which are 
 12
favorable to whatever group they are supporting.” They generally provide 
information on non-policy issues such as candidate characteristics, and as a 
consequence, ordinary citizens are uncertain about where a candidate is located on 
the policy dimension.  
Enelow and Hinich (1984-a) classify uncertainty into three distinctive 
types:  First, uncertainty can be induced by the candidates who change their 
positions from one election period to the next (candidate-induced uncertainty). In 
many circumstances, candidates strategically present ambiguous policy stands 
during election periods (Shepsle 1972) and move on the policy dimension 
between election periods. Candidate-induced uncertainty is assumed to leads 
voters to decide their votes by estimating the probability that candidates will 
change their positions.  
Second, uncertainty may be the result of disincentiv s and the inability of 
voters to acquire and process costly information (perceptual uncertainty). As 
Enelow and Hinich point out, “voters typically lack incentives to resolve 
uncertainties they have about the candidates” (1984-a: 115), given that 
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information is costly to acquire. In addition, because the media tend to provide 
information about non-policy characteristics of thecandidate rather than 
information about the candidate’s policy positions, campaign information is 
“inherently imperfect” (1984-a: 122). As a result, voters tend to rely more on non-
policy characteristics than on policy-oriented information and a distortion or noise 
results while candidates’ true positions are transmitting to the voters. This 
distortion is considered a random element rather than a single point.   
Finally, uncertainty about candidate positions may be caused by the 
difficulty of prediction about real policy change if a candidate is elected to office 
(predictive uncertainty). Because prediction of future events is difficult to be 
precise, this type of prediction is also characterized by a probability density 
around a set of points rather than by a point.   
While these types of voter uncertainty appear quite distinct, for example, 
the first is exogenous and the second and third are endogenous (Alvarez 2001: 
30), in practice they are difficult to distinguish. As Alvarez states, perceptual 
uncertainty comes both from “candidates’ incentives to disseminate ambiguous 
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information” as well as voters’ disincentives of processing costly information. In 
addition, because predicting future policies can only be based on ascertaining the 
current positions of the candidates, predictive uncertainty is linked to the 
uncertainty caused from the first two types. As thistudy focuses on information 
shortcomings in the electorate, in other words, “endogenously driven uncertainty 
in voters’ minds (Alvarez 2001:30),” it basically employs the concept of 
perceptual uncertainty rooted in a noisy information process, but to be complete 
must encompass all three types of uncertainty.   
 
Under these uncertainties, voters’ perceived position of candidate A is a 
random variable, A A Aω ω ε= +% , where Aω  is candidate A’s true position and Aε  
is the error resulting from the voter’s uncertainty about the candidate position.  
 In the probabilistic spatial model, uncertainty about candidate positions is 
commonly expressed as the error term of the utility function that each voter uses 
when evaluating the candidates. Let Ujm represent voter m’s utility for candidate j. 
Voter m’s utility for candidate j is typically specified as the sum of spatial 
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jm j m jmA
U zβ π ε= − +  
where πj denotes the coordinates of the j
th politician on a k-dimensional policy 
space; zm denotes the ideal point of the m
th respondent in the space; 
s
Amj
z−π denotes a measure of distance between πj a d zm; and εjm, is a random 
variable representing voter m’s uncertainty about candidate j, which is assumed to 
follow a normal distribution with zero mean and homoskedastic variance. The 
smaller the variances of this distribution, the less uncertainty the voter has about 
the candidate1. 
In an election with two candidates, j=0, 1, voter m is assumed to vote for 
candidate 1 if and only if her utility for candidate 1 exceeds her utility for 
candidate 0: 
                                                
1 As discussed above, this uncertainty may arise mainly from a voter’s inability of establishing 
the candidate’s positions. The utility function, however, does not leave out the possibility that the 
error interpreted as uncertainty results from the voter’s non-policy considerations for the candidate 
instead of considering the issue positions of the candidate (Lin et al. 1999).  
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 1 0 1 0( ) 0
ss
m m mm mU U z zβ π π ε− = − − − − >  
where 20 1 ~ (0, )m m m Nε ε ε σ≡ − , representing voter m’s uncertainty concerning 
candidate preference. Again, a smaller variance of this corresponds to a lower 
level of voter m’s uncertainty. 
 
 2.1.2  Homogeneity Assumption of Uncertainty 
 When using the hypothesis of the randomness of perceived candidate 
positions, a crucial assumption of the spatial model f voting is that the error term, 
uncertainty, is homogeneous in its degree across individuals. In fact, though 
probabilistic spatial voting models contain an element of uncertainty that allows 
“some positive probability for choosing a candidate who is not closest to the voter 
in the predictive space (Lin et al. 1999: 60),” most ignore heterogeneity in 
information and uncertainty. Some studies have addressed imperfect or limited 
information but only have justified spatial-theoretical assumption about voters’ 
capabilities to draw accurate maps of politics even with little information. They 
often insist that uncertainty is an obvious characteris ic of issue voting because of 
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imperfect nature of campaign information, but that it is not a significant problem 
because uninformed voters can infer more informed pr ferences by using 
information shortcuts to compensate for their lack of information. 
 According to McKelvey and Ordeshook(1986), equilibrium is assumed to 
extract enough information about candidate locations t  make a correct decision 
at candidate midpoint, due to sources such as interest g oup endorsements and 
other voters’ preferences observed in poll results. Uninformed voters can vote 
rationally by voting according to sources they assume are informed and rational. 
According to McKelvey and Ordeshook, these “cues can provide more than 
approximations (McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986: 934).” As a consequence, 
candidate positions in equilibrium reflect the prefe nces of both the informed and 
the uninformed. Similarly, Grofman and Norrander (1990) argue that, in a one-
dimensional two-candidate competition, because voters can use group 
endorsements as information cues, they do not need to know anything directly 
about candidate positions on issues. Assuming that each voter can have 
knowledge of the relative proximity of reference groups to the voter (225), they 
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propose that the best choice for the voter is the choice suggested by the group that 
is closet to his own preferences.   
 Hinich and Munger (1994) claim that ideology, rather than polls and 
endorsements, is the basis for uncertain political choice in a large, mass electorate. 
Voters use ideology as a reduced policy dimension in such a way that they 
abstractly predict a candidate’s position when the actual issues are unknown. 
(100). According to Hinich and Munger, because ideologies within the political 
sphere are typically reduced to binaries (144), and an ideology offers a shared 
perception of a good society, selecting between one of two ideologies may give 
uninformed citizens an information advantage when choosing candidates. Hence, 
the informed and uninformed do not necessarily have diff rent shapes of 
distributions of candidate positions.  
 The information shortcut explanation was introduced into spatial theory 
from the ideas of political psychology. Political psychologists suggest that 
ordinary people are capable of inferring informed preferences, due to their ability 
to make reasonable decisions with minimal cognitive effort by employing 
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information shortcuts or heuristics. However, various studies have shown that the 
information shortcut explanation is questionable.   
 The following section addresses literature that considers political 
conceptualization, information or sophistication. Then in Section 2.3, I discuss 
literature concerning the information shortcut explanation specifically. Both 
sections suggest that assuming the homogeneity of voters’ uncertainty has not 
obtained theoretical or empirical validity, and provide strong arguments in favor 
of specifying information effects in spatial models of voting. Section 2.4 
addresses the literature of spatial voting that suggests the possibility of unifying 
different scholarly traditions into one model comprising heterogeneity in voter 
uncertainty. Then, Section 2.5 turns to the question of how heterogeneous 
uncertainty affects voting decisions. As a significant disagreement about the 
electoral consequences of uncertainty exists in the s udy of spatial voting, this 
dissertation attempts to explore whether and how uncertainty – heterogeneous 
uncertainty – matters. Finally, in Section 2.6, I establish my hypotheses and 
demonstrate my expectations based on the literature. 
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2.2 The Effect of Political Information and Conceptualization 
 Since the early Michigan School scholars suggested that a great deal of the 
public have no opinions about political issues, public opinion researchers have 
learned that political information varies across individual voters, having 
significant effects on political attitudes and behavior. 
 The authors of The American Voters (1960), Campbell et al., discuss the 
concept of ideological conceptualization and reveal th t large proportions of the 
American public in 1956 displayed low levels of coneptualization. According to 
their classification of conceptualization, around one half of Americans were 
classified either as making simplistic connection between goodness and badness 
or having perceptions of candidates not based around policies, and only around 
11.5 percent of the electorate showed ideological interpretation in their political 
attitudes (222-23).  
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 In his seminal article, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” 
Converse (1964) asserts that large segments of the electorate show low levels of 
ideological conceptualization, and thus, lack ideological constraint, which is 
central in a belief system that implies consistency between idea elements in an 
ideology. From his findings that show minimal attitudinal consistency between 
issue items as well as little stability over time, h  concludes that “the individual 
lacks the contextual grasp to understand that the specific case and the general 
principle belong in the same belief system (Converse 1964: 230).” According to 
Converse, because only politically knowledgeable people pay enough attention to 
elite discourse, the source of mass ideologies, attitude constraint develops mainly 
among the more politically sophisticated, those that are better educated and 
already more politically involved. 
 Even if changes have taken place since Converse, empirical evidence has 
shown that the mass public still has lower levels of conceptualization than the 
politically sophisticated. Nie et al. (1976) find tha , despite a significant change 
toward a higher level of conceptualization from 1952 to 1976, there still existed 
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cognitive limitations among the public and that numbers of politically 
sophisticated people did not increase significantly. According to Delli Carpini and 
Keeter (1991), who compare the level of political knowledge in 1989 with those 
in 1940s and 1950s, levels of political knowledge ev n declined significantly. 
Other scholars reveal that there is a distribution of sophistication levels in the 
electorate (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Jacoby 1986, 1991, and 1995). Jacoby 
discovers that the higher one’s political sophistication, the more heavily one relies 
on the liberal-conservative dimension. Similarly, Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), 
Alvarez (2001) and others show that political information promotes “consistency 
between voters’ opinions and their votes” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996: 255). 
Further, scholars find that higher levels of political sophistication lead to more 
systematic structures of perceiving candidates. An agreement is that less 
sophisticated (or informed) people tend to place candidates at the midpoints of 
issue scales while more sophisticated people tend to perceive candidates at more 
ideologically extreme positions (Alvrez and Frankli 1994; Glasgow 1999; Judd 
and Lusk, 1984; Linville, 1982; Linville and Jones, 1980; Sniderman et al. 1991; 
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Tesser and Leone, 1977; Zaller, 1992).  
While scholars of political conceptualization and sophistication were 
challenged on methodological grounds,2  many studies with methodological 
improvements have persisted that more valid and reliabl  measures of 
conceptualization support the findings of conceptualization literature: different 
levels of integration in the public’s belief system and varying ability in linking 
abstract principles to specific applications (Cassel 1984; Hagner and Pierce 1982; 
Wyckoff 1987). 
All these studies agree that voters have heterogeneus but as a whole 
substantially low levels of information and conceptualization. More recently, 
empirical researchers have begun to find sizable and consistent differences in 
political opinion and behavior between well and poorly informed citizens.  
Zaller (1992) finds that the opinions of more politically aware people are 
subject to greater constraint than those less aware. According to his model 
consisting of several axioms, more aware people have igher levels of cognitive 
                                                
2 See Smith (1980). 
 24
engagement with political messages from elite discourse and are more likely to 
resist information inconsistent with their values and accept information consistent 
with them. Revealing the lack of political information in the American electorate, 
Delli Carprini and Keeter (1996) show substantial and often dramatic differences 
between highly and poorly informed people lead to different levels of political 
virtues, interests, political activities as well asstability and consistency of 
political opinions. They conclude that a lack of information in the electorate has a 
critical consequence in that misperception of what t e government and candidates 
do and do not sharply curtail the public’s rationality of choices. More recently, 
Bartle (2000) insists that the constrained and stable opinions of most voters are 
systematically associated with measurement error and that different levels of 
political knowledge among the British electorate yild considerable heterogeneity 
in constraint and temporal stability of ideological positions and opinions. 
Consequently, he warns that we should be cautious to apply issue-voting model to 
people with low levels of awareness (481). 
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Several studies attempt to formally test the hypothesis that uninformed 
voters successfully use cues and information shortcuts to behave as if they were 
fully informed. Bartels (1996) estimates that hypothetical full information would 
have shifted votes up to almost five percentage points. Althaus (1998)’s 
simulation with the 1988 and 1992 American National Election Studies data also 
presents that correcting for information asymmetries produces different collective 
preferences from actual ones.3 From a series of deliberative polling designed to 
determine the effect of political deliberation, Fishkin, Luskin and their colleagues 
(1998, 1999, 2000, and 2002) have discovered that more political information and 
thought about issues can induce a significant shiftin political attitudes and 
outcomes. These findings strongly support the claim that information 
heterogeneity exists across the electorate and this uneven distribution of political 
information in the electorate may produce distorted political outcomes.  
 
                                                
3 In a working paper, Luskin and Globetti (1997) also e timate the effect of full information in the 
1988 presidential election up to almost four percentage points. Their finding suggests that Bush 
would have lost in 1988, if the electorate were fully informed. 
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2.3  Decisions Made with Limited Information  
While public opinion researchers have found empirical evidence on 
information disparity among voters and its critical impact on political outcomes, 
this pessimistic view of the public’s abilities has been challenged by the literature 
that asserts rationality of public opinion. This line of studies suggest that ordinary 
people can form opinions consist with their political predispositions despite little 
information, because they can use various information cues, so-called, heuristics. 
People can successfully infer their own policy prefe nces from their liked or 
disliked figures, prior information about candidates, partisan cues, group 
endorsement, ideology, incumbency, retrospective evaluations of the economy 
and others. 
Among these various information sources, the most prevalent, probably 
the most important, information cue for vote decision among the American public 
is individual’s partisanship – the affiliation with a party and its strength. The 
psychological affective attachment to a party is a core value that shapes proximate 
attitudes toward candidates, parties or policies in America. Most voters who 
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identify with one of the two major parties can have th ir perceptions of parties, 
candidates, and policies based on their partisan orie tation. Many scholars have 
agreed to Compbell et al.’s claim that party identification raises a perpetual screen 
(Campbell et al. 1960) that filters new information a d colors individuals’ 
political attitudes. Jacoby finds that an individual’s issue positions are “a function 
of perceptions of his/her party’s stands (1988: 643)” on those issues. Zaller (1992) 
also proposes that partisan considerations lead people t  resist accepting new 
information that does not conform to their partisan orientation. In this vein, as 
Jacoby (1988) suggests, partisanship acts as reference group providing cues for 
guiding individual political preferences. Ever since Campbell et al. (1960) who 
insist the unequal effect of partisan allegiance across the electorate, many scholars 
have found that the people depend more on their partisan cues for vote choice 
when they are less informed and thus have little prior erception of political 
objects. More recently, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) show that the less politically 
sophisticated tend to use the partisan cue as well as the candidate appearance cue 
in making vote decisions. According to Schaffner and Streb (2002), less informed 
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survey respondents are less able to express vote pref rences when candidates’ 
party labels are not available.  
Another salient information cue affecting voters’ decisions is candidate 
considerations indicating such factors as a candidate’s personality, character, 
abilities, appearances, demeanor and personal history. The relevant literature 
disaggregates these considerations to competence, integrity, empathy, leadership, 
reliability, charisma and other personal characteris ics (Miller et al. 1986; Rahn et 
al. 1990) or even more micro-level attributes like carriage and vocal tone 
(Rosenberg et al. 1986), etc. This literature emphasizes that these factors are less 
abstract and thus easier to be stored and retrieved (Miller et al. 1986: 525).  
Using these information cues, or heuristic, is, according to Sniderman, 
Brody and Tetlock, an efficient way to organize and simplify political choices, in 
both the senses of “requiring relatively little information to execute, yet yielding 
dependable answers to complex problems of choice (Sniderman, Brody and 
Tetlock 1991: 19).” Therefore, scholars of this line claim that relying on 
information cues may not bear irrational decisions but lead voters’ decisions to be 
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rational and mostly correct. For instance, according to Fiorina (1981), party 
identification is updated information based on their l arning about parties through 
the politicians’ past performance in office. On a basis of this information, Fiorina 
argues, voters vote for the partisan candidates who are expected to provide them 
with the most utility. Popkin (1991) claims that the ability of individual citizens to 
make sense of the political world necessarily allows collective opinion to be real 
and highly stable. He calls the voters having this ability “reasoning voters” with 
“low-information” or “gut” rationality, which is drawn from various information 
shortcuts that voters use to simplify the process of ch osing among political 
choices. This reasoned choice does not require complete information but requires 
only the ability to predict the consequences of actions (Lupia and McCubbins 
1999). By accessing particular information shortcuts, ninformed voters can 
emulate the behavior of well informed voters (Lupia 1994). In this sense, as Stroh 
(1995) argues, voters may be “pragmatic cognitive misers” who employ minimal 
cognitive effort to attribute their preferences on the basis of their existing 
knowledge of politics.  
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While this heuristic-based explanation is widely accepted by psychology-
oriented political scientists as a compelling way to reconcile widespread political 
ignorance and low levels of information, it has also faced various criticisms. As a 
matter of fact, cognitive psychologists of heuristic literature agree that the psychic 
mechanisms of heuristic use are not yet clear (Kahneman, Solvic and Tversky 
1982). They note that the use of heuristics is uncons i us and dysfunctional, 
causing a certain degree of unreliability (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000: 166). The 
misapplication of heuristics can lead people astray in some important inferential 
tasks (Nisbett and Ross 1980: 18). Empirical researchers have criticized the 
absence of compelling empirical evidence that such information cues provide a 
systematic explanation to a variety of divergences between poorly and highly-
informed election outcomes (Bartles 1996). As Lau and Redlawsk point out, the 
empirical evidence demonstrating the “very real effect of political information per 
se on political preferences” makes it dangerous to merely assume that heuristics 
overcome cognitive limitations (Lau and Redlawsk 2001: 952).    
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A recent, and sensible, criticism of heuristic literature asserts that it has 
not addressed heterogeneity among individuals in the use of heuristics and its 
effect on political outcomes. Kuklinski and Quirk warn that heuristic use can 
hardly be a rational strategy because people use information shortcuts 
“unknowingly and automatically” rather than carefully and accurately (Kuklinski 
and Quirk 2000: 156). They also point out that peopl  not only often lack the 
contextual knowledge needed for the intelligent use of heuristics but also miss the 
environment which they impute the cues from (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000: 156). 
Therefore, people can take cues adequately only if they know political contexts 
and provisions relatively well (Kuklinski and Quirk 2000: 158). A similar 
argument has already been made by Mondak (1993) who shows that people are 
more likely to use heuristics when they have higher motivation and cognitive 
ability. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) also demonstrate that, whereas party 
identification has strong relationship with voters’ stands on issues among more 
informed people, party identification among less informed people has little 
relation with their issue stands. From this finding, he argues that “the value of 
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partisanship as a shortcut to political decision making is dependent on citizens’ 
ability to base that partisanship on more specific political information” (1996: 
252).      
More recently, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) consider an interaction between 
political sophistication and the outcomes of heuristic use. They find that political 
heuristics are particularly efficacious for politically sophisticated voters due to 
their greater ability to relate relevant information. According to their findings, 
although almost everyone uses various kinds of heuristics for decision-making, 
ironically, heuristics help only politically informed people who would need them 
least. They show that the use of heuristics generally increases the probability of a 
correct vote4 by political experts, while it decreases the probability of a correct 
vote by the less politically sophisticated. Similarly, Alvarez (2001) also finds that 
more certain voters are better able than less certain voters to use party-related and 
candidate traits-related information as well as policy-oriented information. As Lau 
                                                
4 Lau and Redlawsk (1997: 586) define a correct votedecision as “one that is the same as the 
choice which would have been made under conditions of full information.” Therefore, their 
concept of correctness is based on “fully informed interests of individual voters.” 
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and Redlawsk conclude, these findings imply that heuristics may not substitute for 
political information in predicting correct voting (Lau and Redlawsk 2001: 966).     
 
2.4  Information and the Spatial Theory of Voting 
As seen above, the findings of empirical studies underline the importance 
of incorporating information heterogeneity in models of rational opinion and 
behavior. Interestingly enough, the same insight has long been shared by the first 
pioneer of rational choice theory.  
 Downs (1957), in his seminal book, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 
uses an “uncertainty scale” to classify voters and nonvoters. According to Downs, 
uncertainty, as a lack of information, divides voters into different classes with 
various levels of information and persuasion or political activism.5 Activists, the 
                                                
5 Among voters are agitators (activists), passives, loyalists and quasi-informed passives, whereas 
nonvoters are classified as neutrals, apathetics, quasi-informed neutrals and baffleds (Downs 1957: 
84-86). While agitators actively persuade others as the most certain about their decisions, passives 
and neutrals who are also certain are not interested in persuading others to agree with them as well 
as not open to others’ influences. Loyalists and apathetics are habitually voting or abstaining 
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most informed and the least uncertain about their el ctoral preferences, persuade 
uninformed voters by providing facts favorable to the candidate or party they 
support. At the other extreme of the uncertainty scale are “baffleds” who are least 
informed and least certain, so much so that they cannot make decision. This 
classification suggests that activism and information play a conspicuous role in 
the fledging spatial theory of voting.    
Spatial analysts after Downs, however, have mostly ignored information 
heterogeneity. In particular, the deterministic spatial model assumes full 
information. It posits that all voters can conceptualize a policy space, can locate 
their own ideal points and the candidates’ positions, and can correctly respond to 
even an infinitesimal shift in candidate positions. This assumption is contradicted 
by the findings of the literature reviewed above; that the level of information in 
the electorate is heterogeneous and generally low. 
                                                                                                                          
without becoming well-informed. Quasi-informed passive  and quasi-informed neutrals are 
uncertain but reach the tentative conclusions about their preferences.  
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Probabilistic voting models take uncertainty into account to mitigate this 
inconsistency between information literature and the spatial theory of voting. 
Since such scholars as Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook (1972), Hinich (1977), 
Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) developed the concept of r babilistic voting and 
Enelow and Hinich (1981) introduced the spatial model that allows for voters’ 
uncertainty about candidate positions, most spatial n ysts have agreed that the 
mass public is not certain about candidate positions and that the voting model 
should contain an element of uncertainty that allows some positive probability for 
choosing a candidate who is not closest to the voter in the predictive space (Lin et 
al. 1999: 60). Some empirically-oriented scholars confirm that uncertainty about 
candidate positions is pervasive among voters and an important determinant of 
electoral choices (Bartles 1986; Alvarez 2001).  
During the last decades, spatial theorists have been int rested in the 
implications of uncertainty in relation to electoral equilibrium, which is difficult 
to obtain in deterministic spatial voting models. Enelow and Hinich (1989) 
develop a general probabilistic spatial model of voting for two-candidate 
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competitions where the likelihood of global equilibrium depends on size of the 
variance of the random disturbance term of the voting function, as well as on 
factors such as policy salience, degree of concavity of voter utility functions, the 
size of feasible set of candidate policy locations, and the dimensionality of the 
policy space. The authors show that, as the variance of the random error term 
increases, it becomes easier to satisfy the sufficient condition for candidate 
equilibrium.  
Expanding this model to the case of multi-candidate competitions, Lin et 
al. (1999) prove that a large degree of voter uncertainty is a sufficient condition 
for concavity of the candidate expected vote function in multi-candidate, 
multidimensional probabilistic spatial voting. Under concavity, rational 
candidates converge at a “minimum-sum point” at which total distances from all 
voter ideal points are minimized as a geometric center of the ideal point 
distribution. The authors demonstrate with several different distance measures 
that, if voter uncertainty is beyond a certain point, convergent equilibrium is 
globally stable.    
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These findings show that the generally high level of voter uncertainty as 
revealed by information literature does figure into spatial theory with important 
implications. However, as discussed above, analysts assume that the random 
variable in these models is independently and identcally distributed - a 
homogeneity assumption that is contradicted by information literature. A basic 
assumption of probabilistic models is that voter uncertainty varies across the 
candidates as a function of such factors as campaign spending and incumbency, 
but is homogeneous across the individual voters.   
Notable exceptions are Aldrich (1983a, 1983b) and Schofield’s recent 
articles with his associates (Schofield 2003; Miller and Schofield 2003; Schofield 
et al. 2003; Schofield and Sened 2005), both of which emphasize the role of 
political activists. By incorporating activism into heir spatial models, their works 
revive Downs’ argument of voter heterogeneity on the uncertainty scale.  
Aldrich (1983a, 1983b) argues that an individual’s utility calculation 
depends on the average preference of the party activists rather than that of all 
voters. According to him, in a unidimensional space, parties are stable at cleaved 
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positions, where party activists are distributed in a way that they are “relatively 
cohesive internally and relatively distinctive from each other” (Aldrich 1983a: 
985). In general, in a multidimensional space where the two parties compete over 
a single mode, alienation and indifference as a part of the activist’s decision 
calculus contribute to electoral stability (Aldrich 1983b). Equilibrium exists 
where alienation from a party induces convergence toward the densest 
concentration of ideal points of activists, while indifference between becoming an 
activist in either party is a diverging force that keeps parties from being too close 
to each other. 
Schofield and his associates also note that the need to nhance an activist-
generated valence leads candidates to take divergent positions in equilibrium. In 
their model in which voter utility is a function ofthe valence terms as well as the 
distance between the candidate and the voters,6 the activist-generated valence is 
                                                
6 The formal expression of the model is as follows: 
 ( )
s
jm j j m jmU z zλ β π ε= − − +   
where jλ is the activist valence , a differential function of π  which is concave in jπ , with all 
other notations being the same as those discussed in Section 2.1.  
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presumed as a function of the policy choices of the candidates, while the 
candidate popularity valence is characterized by the s ochastic error term assumed 
to be i.i.d. (independently and identically distributed). A candidate’s policy 
positions motivate activists to contribute resources to the candidate and those 
resources that the candidate can use to enhance his/h r valence. According to the 
authors, because the vote-maximizing candidate mustappeal to both activists, 
who are more concerned about maintaining the ideological stance of the party, 
and disaffected or ordinary voters, who see no perceptible difference between the 
two parties’ policy positions, “a rational candidate chooses a policy position so as 
to balance activist contributions and voter responses (Miller and Schofield 2003: 
253).”  
Although Aldrich and Schofield and his colleagues are not particularly 
concerned with uncertainty varying across voters, their findings verify that voter 
heterogeneity in political activism is a crucial element in the vote process and the 
optimal candidate positions. As the level of political activism forms the 
uncertainty scale in Downs’ work, those findings infer the existence and 
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importance of heterogeneity in voter uncertainty. Splitting voters into three sub-
groups based on levels of uncertainty about the candid te policy positions, 
Alvarez (2001) provides empirical evidence not only that voters’ uncertainty 
levels vary but also that more uncertain voters and less uncertain voters are 
different in their candidate preferences and decision-making processes. He finds 
that a voter more uncertain about a candidate’s policy positions is less likely to 
vote for that candidate. 
Built on these theoretical and empirical findings as well as the findings of 
the information literature, the present study assumes that uncertainty or risk of the 
vote process is not homogeneous across the voters particularly because the voters 
are heterogeneous in the levels of political activism or information. By 
hypothesizing that uncertainty is a function of information and political activism, 
I incorporate the heterogeneity of voter uncertainty i  the spatial voting model.  
The theoretical and methodological approaches in this study are borrowed 
from Lin (2005)’s study on information and ideological structure in Taiwan’s 
2004 presidential election. By addressing the heterogeneity of voter uncertainty in 
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the spatial model of binary choice, Lin discovers that variations in political 
activism and such information cues as partisan streng h have direct influences on 
voter uncertainty. Lin argues that, “in light of recent developments in both the 
information literature and the spatial theoretic literature, it is time that spatial 
analysts revisit Downs (1957) and reunify the litera u e” (2005: 7).  
This dissertation applies Lin’s spatial modeling with different 
specifications to the data from the recent four presid ntial elections in the U.S. to 
investigate how information heterogeneity among the vot rs affects the spatial 
structure and voting of the U.S. electorate. Whereas vote choice in the 2004 
Taiwan election was dependent dominantly upon spatial proximity based on 
Green vs. Blue ideological cleavage (Lin, 2005: 2), vote choice in the four recent 
U.S. presidential elections were not defined by a single dominant dimension, but 
affected by several non-policy considerations in addition to several campaign 
issues. It is not implausible to expect that those non-policy considerations as 
information cues may decrease uncertainty among less informed and less active 
voters; and as a result, eliminate the gap between informed/active voters and 
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uninformed/inactive voters in their uncertainty levels. The primary question of 
this dissertation is, therefore, whether uncertainty varies across the electorate as a 
result of information heterogeneity in the U.S. electoral context, in which various 
non-policy factors provide the voters with important voting cues. 
If there is a significant gap in the level of uncertainty between the 
informed/active and the uninformed/inactive, an essential question that can be 
taken up is: “What is the consequence of (heterogeneous) uncertainty?” In 
relation to this question, a significant divergence exists among spatial analysts. 
The following section discusses the disagreement with respect to the role of 
uncertainty in determining the election outcome.  
 
2.5 Electoral Consequences of Voter Uncertainty 
 The spatial voting model basically assumes that voters’ utilities are a 
function of the distances between each voter’s most preferred position and the 
candidate’s expected positions. Enelow and Hinich (1981, 1984-a) extend this 
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spatial model to allow for the probability that voters are uncertain about the 
candidates’ issue positions. Formally, their model is 
 2( ) ijjk ik jk
k k
ji z V CU π− − − += ∑ ∑  
where πjk and zik denote the positions of the j
th candidate and ith voter on issue k; 
Vijk represents the variance of the distribution of j’s location on issue k. it is 
assumed to be identical for each voter; and Cij >0 is a constant representing the 
non-policy value of candidate j to voter i. 
. In Enelow and Hinich’s model, the component of uncertainty that is 
represented as the variance, is simply an additional factor determining voters’ 
utilities. Hence, the expected utility, or vote choice, depends not only on the 
quadratic distance between the candidate’s location nd each voter’s ideal point, 
but also on the variance of the voter’s perceptions (u certainty). As the utility 
function here is concave with quadratic issue distances, this utility calculus 
assumes that voters are risk-averse (Bartels, 1986; Berinsky and Lewis, 2007). 
This implies that “voters discount a candidate with a given level of uncertainty 
(Berinsky and Lewis, 2007: 142)”, and as a consequence, are less likely to vote 
 44
for the candidate whose positions they are relatively uncertain about, as long as 
the expected positions of the two candidates are the same.  
  The utility model employed in this study also has the same assumption in 
voters’ risk preference by using quadratic Euclidean distances. The only 
difference with Enelow-Hinich model is that whereas their model assumes the 
variance as fixed across the electorate, the model of this study assumes the 
variance as a function of exogenous variables, that is,   
exp( )i iZσ γ=   where Zi is exogenous variables.  
 Achen (2002) points out that the utility model compromising the 
component explaining heteroskedasticity is almost equivalent to the Enelow-
Hinich model with iZ γ  replacing the variance. Therefore, the exogenous 
variables (information and activism here) not only affect the disturbance variance, 
but also affect the utility directly.7 That is, if the standard deviation of the model 
( iσ ) is a negative function of information and activism, according to Achen, it is 
almost equivalent to the model having information and ctivism as independent 
                                                
7 Formal descriptions for this as well as for the Enelow-Hinich model are contained in Chapter 6.  
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variables with positive signs, assuming that the int rcept attached toiZ γ is positive. 
The straightforward substantive interpretation of this is that the more information 
a voter has about a candidate, the more likely s/he i  to vote for that candidate. 
This clearly reflects voters’ risk-aversion attitude that attempts to avoid risk from 
supporting the candidate with uncertain positions.   
 Empirical analyses have also found that voter uncertainty about the 
candidate positions depresses the voter’s utility for the candidate and hence the 
probability of supporting the candidate. Bartels (1986) estimates the effect of 
uncertainty on vote choice and discovers that the vot rs dislike uncertainty. He 
finds that voter uncertainty in the 1980 presidential election had a negative effect 
on vote choice to a similar degree to that of issue distances. Similarly, with the 
measure of uncertainty based on the squared dispersion of the voters’ perception 
of the candidate’s position and the candidate’s true position, Alvarez (2001) also 
provides empirical evidence from the voters in the 1976 to 1996 presidential 
elections that the greater the voter’s uncertainty about the candidate’s policy 
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positions, the less likely the voter was to support the candidate, all other things 
held constant. 
Scholars have found that uncertainty is generally less for incumbents or 
better-known candidates than it is for challengers or lesser-known candidates 
(Alvarez 2001; Bartels 1986; Enelow and Hinich 1984-a). Because challengers 
usually do not emerge nationally until the Spring primaries, they lag behind in 
public awareness. Thus, under the assumption of risk-aversion, a greater level of 
voter uncertainty about the challenger’s policy positi ns may be a critical source 
for the disadvantages and uphill tasks that challengers usually face.  
The finding of Sniderman et al. (1991) also highligts the prominence of 
the incumbent that the challenger is hard to match. Their finding demonstrates 
that poorly informed voters do not learn about or pay attention to the challenger, 
but instead, they are interested only in the incumbent. According to the authors, 
the key difference between the well-informed and the poorly-informed in their 
vote choices is that the well-informed make decision  by comparing the two 
candidates, whereas the poorly-informed judge on the basis of the incumbent’s 
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performance, particularly with respect to national economic conditions. This 
finding implies that voters may have different voting preferences because of their 
heterogeneity in information levels, which make the voters’ dominant 
considerations vary. As uninformed or uncertain voters end to pay little attention 
to the challenger’s position, compared to informed or certain voters, they would 
be more likely than informed or certain voters to vote for the incumbent rather 
than the ambiguous challenger, if all other things being equal. In Chapter 6, I 
derive a model of uncertainty from the Enelow-Hinich model and Achen’s 
formulation related to the heteroskedastic probit model, with the expectation that 
the more uncertain a voter is about the challenger, th  more likely the voter is to 
vote for the incumbent. With this model, the chapter explores whether 
heterogeneity in uncertainty produce any systematic difference among voters in 





2.6 Hypotheses and Expectations 
 This study examines the effect of information heterog neity in spatial 
voting. For this purpose, an attempt is made to unify the literature discussed 
above: the literature of spatial voting and the litra ure of political information, or 
sophistication. Drawing insight from Downs’ (1957) early findings on uncertainty, 
coupled with recent developments in both spatial theory and public opinion 
research; the following hypothesis and expectations are proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: Uncertainty about candidate preference will not be homogeneous 
across the electorate, but will be a function of information and 
activism.   
   
Expectation 1: In the circumstance of issue voting, where voter u ility is 
differentiated by issue proximity, voter uncertainty regarding vote 
choice will be decreased as the voters become more inf rmed and 
more active. Because the less informed and the less active are those 
who have trouble in ideologically conceptualizing positional issues 
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and perceiving true candidate positions on those issue , the effect of 
information heterogeneity on voter uncertainty regading issue 
voting will be more evident than in other electoral circumstances.  
 Expectation 2: Because heuristic use provides voters with cues about how the 
candidates will perform in office, it will decrease the uncertainty 
for all voters. However, those information cues will not be enough 
to eliminate heterogeneity of uncertainty. With those cues available 
to voters, the uninformed and the inactive will still have greater 
uncertainty about the candidates than well-informed an  active 
voters.  
 
 This study is also interested in the electoral consequences of heterogeneity 
in voter uncertainty. Both the theoretical and empirical findings based on the 
assumption of risk aversion suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2:  Voters tend to dislike the candidate who they are relatively 
uncertain about, all other things held constant. As uncertain voters 
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are less likely to know about the challenger than the incumbent, 
whereas certain voters are likely to be relatively well informed 
about both the challenger and the incumbent, uncertain voters will 
be more likely than certain voters to vote for a well-known 









A Model of Heteroskedastic Error and Measurement 
 
 To explore voter uncertainty heterogeneous across v ters in a spatial 
voting model, I employ a heteroskedastic probit model for vote choice, which Lin 
proposes (2005). The heteroskedastic probit model, discussed in Section 3.2, has a 
separate equation to model the error variance. Whereas standard probit 
estimations for binary choices assume an equal variance across observations, the 
heteroskedastic probit model can accommodate expectations of heteroskedastic 
errors. I hypothesize that voter uncertainty about candidates is heterogeneous 
across voters as a function of information and political activism. Therefore, the 
variance equation of the heteroskedastic probit model accounts for how these two 
variables affect the error variance of vote choice. The heteroskedastic probit 
model is tested using American National Election Study (ANES) data from four 
recent presidential election years. 
 52
 The vote choice equation of the heteroskedastic probit model employed in 
this study specifies the key assumption of the spatial theory of voting: voting 
utility is a linear function of spatial proximity between positions of candidates and 
voters. I discuss the measurement of distance between candidates and voters in 
Section 3.2. To estimate candidate and voter position  n the issue dimensions, I 
use the Aldrich-McKelvey scaling method applied to the ANES data. I explain the 
measurement and operationalization of the survey items applied to the 
heteroskedastic probit model and the Aldrich-McKelvey scaling methods in 
Section 3.3. 
 
3.1  A Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Spatial Voting 
 To specify information heterogeneity on the probabilistic spatial voting 
model, I employ the heteroskedastic probit model that Lin (2005) developed for 
spatial voting in the 2004 Taiwan presidential election8 but with some different 
                                                
8 This dissertation owes its methodological strategies to Lin’s 2005 paper to a substantial degree. 
The description of the heteroskedastic probit model in this section is borrowed from what Lin 
portrays in his paper.     
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specifications. The heteroskedastic probit model differs from a standard probit 
model in that it can directly account for errors in prediction by estimating the 
error variance in a separate equation. Because the unequal variance may make the 
maximum likelihood estimators inconsistent in a dichotomous choice model 
(Yatchew and Griliches 1985: 135), it is essential th t the heteroskedasticity be 
specified in a probit model. By specifying and estimate simultaneously the 
equation of the probability of a choice and that of the error variance, the 
heteroskedastic probit model is expected to produce consistent estimates.  
 In the probabilistic spatial theory of voting, a voter’s utility for a candidate 
is specified as a linear function of spatial proximity and a random variable 
representing a voter’s uncertainty about the candidate.  










Here πj and zi denote the coordinates of the j
th politician and ith respondent in a k-
dimensional policy space; 
s
A
j izπ − denotes a measure of distance between πj a d 
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zi.9; the coefficient β is customarily set at -1; and εji is the noise resulting from 
inaccurate transmission of the actual candidate position to voters (Enelow and 
Hinich 1984-a: 123) or from i’s non-policy considerations concerning candidate j. 
Typically, εji is assumed to be independently distributed for each c ndidate and 
follow a normal distribution with zero mean and homoskedastic variance 2jσ . 
 In an election with two candidates, j=0, 1, voter i is assumed to vote for 
candidate 1 if and only if her utility for candidate 1 exceeds her utility for 
candidate 0: 
 1 0 1 0( ) 0
ss
i i ii iU U z zβ π π ε− = − − − − >     (1) 
where 20 1 ~ (0, )i i i Nε ε ε σ≡ − .  
Because utilities are unobservable in practice, vote choice, which is observable, 
usually substitutes for utility.   
                                                
9 [ ( ) ' ( )]
s s
j i j i j iA
z z A zπ π π− = − − . A is a kxk symmetric, positive definite matrix, which 
defines a symmetric preference rule (Enelow and Hinich 1984-a: 16) meaning an equivalent 
salience of policy dimensions for the voter. For simplicity, I assume that A is an identity matrix. 
With A=I, if s=1, simple Euclidean distance is used. And if s=2, the quadratic Euclidean distance 
is used.  
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Equation 1 is therefore adequately represented as 
 Pr[ 1]Vote=  





























      (2) 
where Φ() is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) ofthe standard normal 
distribution.  
Equation 2 is the standard probit model. Once candidate positions and voter ideal 
points have been estimated, a maximum likelihood prcedure can estimate the 
model. Its likelihood function is: 
 
1






L p y y y
β β
σ σ=
    
            
= Φ + − −Φ∑           (3) 
where p is the probability of voter i’s vote choice (yi) 
and 1 0i
ss
i iX z zπ π= − − − . 
Conventional probit estimations assume that the variance of the function (σ ) is 
constant. In practice, it is often simply assumed thatσ=1 (Maddala 1983). This 
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assumption infers that all voters have the same levl of uncertainty about 
candidates. 
 In this study, I argue that the variance of the vote choice function is not 
constant but is a function of candidate information and political activism. In 
normal circumstances of a democracy, better informed and more active voters 
may be relatively certain about candidate policy positi ns and thus able to locate 
candidates more correctly in the policy space, whereas less informed and less 
active voters have difficulties in figuring out where the candidates are located. 
The heteroskedastic probit model allows for addressing this heterogeneity across 
voters by modeling the error variance of vote choice. Heterogeneity is 
incorporated in Equation 2 by parameterizing σ such that 
 exp( ' )ixσ γ=      or     log( ) ' ixσ γ=  
where xi is a vector of covariates representing information and activism and γ is a 
vector of coefficients to estimate.  
With the assumption of heteroskedasticity, Equation 2 becomes a heteroskedastic 















= = Φ          (4) 
Two different equations are featured in the model by formulating heterogeneous 
voter choices: a model of choice in the nominator and  model of the error 
variance in the denominator. These can also be estimated by a maximum 
likelihood procedure (Harvey 1976): 
1
log ( | ) log (1 )log 1











    
    
    
    
= Φ + − −Φ∑   (5) 
where p is the probability of voter i’s vote choice (yi) 
and 1 0i
ss
i iX z zπ π= − − − . 
 As the model has two separate equations to be estimated, it allows for a 
joint test of the two theoretical hypotheses: The first hypothesis is 0β < , meaning 
that the closer a candidate’s position is to a voter’s ideal point in the policy space, 
the more likely the voter is to vote for the candidate. This is the key assumption of 
the probabilistic spatial theory of voting, which is applied both to homoskedastic 
probit and heteroskedastic probit.   
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 Regarding the variance equation, I hypothesize0γ < , indicating that the 
more informed and active a voter is, the less uncertain s/he is about her/his 
candidate preference. This hypothesis is central to the study of political 
information.  
 
3.2  Estimating Candidate Positions and Voter Ideal Points 
 To estimate the heteroskedastic probit model whose choice equation is 
specified by the proximity between candidate positins and voters’ most preferred 
positions (ideal points), candidate positions and voter ideal points must first be 
estimated. The American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys have items 
asking respondents to place their own positions and the perceived positions of 
major candidates and parties on a series of seven-point issue scales. For the ANES 
data, I use the Aldrich-McKelvey scaling technique (1977) to recover the 
positions of candidates, parties and respondents in a common issue space. Relying 
on “a principal components solution for the candidate parameters together with a 
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regression estimate of the voter parameters” (p.112)10, the A-M scaling procedure 
intends to eliminate errors resulting from respondents’ own interpretations of the 
seven-point scales that are attributable to methodological difficulties in the 
analysis of the data. According to Aldrich et al. (1982: 392-394), the problems 
associated with the seven-point scales concern the status quo, labeling, reliability, 
and location and intensity. The key issue related to these problems is that the 
respondents should interpret the meaning of points arbitrarily because each point 
does not convey a certain policy position. The scaling model recovers the 
candidates’ (and parties’) true, fixed, positions ad sorts out distortions created by 
respondents’ interpretation of the data to obtain the respondents’ recovered ideal 
points.  
 Formally, let Yij denote the i
th respondent’s perception of candidate j; then 
Yij is generated by the following model:  
                                                
10 The A-M scaling method is a procedure similar to the usual factor analysis. Only difference 
between the A-M procedure and the usual factor analysis is that the A-M method treats the 
common factor as parameters to be estimated, while the factor analysis generally treats the 
common factor as a random variable (See Aldrich and McKelvey 1977: 117). 
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 ij j ijY eπ= +                      (6)  
where jπ  is the true position of j and eij is a random disturbance with an 
expected value of zero, the variance of 2σ  and zero covariance for all i’s and j’s.    
The model thus assumes that the i th voter’s reported position of candidate j 
denoted by Xij consists of some arbitrary linear transformation of the respondent’s 
perception of the space. The transformation is formalized as follows:  
 ij j ij i i ijY e c w Xπ= + = + ,              (7)  
that is, 
1





= − +                       (8) 
where ci and wi are distortion parameters accounting for the actual s rvey 
situation. A negative iw  means that the positions voter i reported for candidate j 



































































 in the way as to get the best 
fit in a least squares sense. That is,  
 i i iY X eβ= −
))
 and  
 
1 1
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n n
i i i i i i
i i
e e Y X Y Xβ β
= =
′ ′= − −∑ ∑
) )) )
.      (9)  
And the solution for iβ
)
 is 
 1( )i i i iX X X Yβ
−′ ′=
) )
.       (10)  
Therefore, “the individual transformation consists of the least-squares regression 
of the reported on the actual (unknown) positions of the candidates (115).” The 
candidate position estimated by this procedure doesn t correspond to the average 























′= −∑ ; and i i iY X β=
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 is an estimate of the ith voters’ perceptions of 
the candidate positions.  




 are used to estimate the respondents’ ideal 
points. The A-M scaling procedure for individual ideal points uses the same 
transformation used to scale the candidate position. Thus, if Xi0 denotes i’s 
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placement of his/her ideal point, the rescaled position of i ( 0iY
)
) is formalized as 
follows:  
 0 0i ii iY c w X= +
) ) )
       (11) 
 
 For the empirical analysis, I use a quadratic Euclidean distance measure 
for proximity calculations of the positions rescaled by the Aldrich-McKelvey 
procedure. In the spatial voting model, with quadratic Euclidean distance, all 
candidates are expected to converge at the mean of voter ideal points (Lin et al. 
1999: 70–72). In probabilistic spatial voting, if candidate j’s expected vote is 
concave and the minimum-sum point is unique, a convergent equilibrium exists at 
the minimum-sum point, which is the shortest total distances from all voter ideal 
points. With quadratic Euclidean distance, the minium-sum point is the voters’ 
mean position on all dimensions (Lin et al. 1999: 70).  
 The concave function in form of quadratic Euclidean distance implies the 
assumption of risk-aversion. Risk-averse voters are expected to vote for the 
candidate whose expected utility is greater for sure. They do not prefer the risky 
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gamble, and thus, do not want to support the candidte whose positions they are 
relatively uncertain about. By employing quadratic Euclidean distances, this 
dissertation also assumes that the voters are risk-averse. 
 
3.3  Measurement and Operationalization 
 I test the heteroskedastic probit model established to examine uncertainty 
about candidate preference using ANES survey data from the four most recent 
presidential election years.  
 The dependent variable of the model is the vote share of the Republican 
candidate in the two-candidate competitions11. 
                                                
11 Because the heteroskedastic probit model is built on binary choice, the dependent variable is 
set to be binary, and thus, includes only the respondents who voted for the candidates of the two 
major parties. While this is, normally, not a critical problem because the elections in the U.S. are 
usually reduced to two-candidate competitions, the exclusion of Perot may produce somehow 
distorted prediction of votes in 1992, when Perot obtained around 20% of the total votes. 
However, because voter uncertainty about Perot may be greater than voter uncertainty about the 
two major-party candidates, the exclusion of Perot is nly expected to decrease the variations in 




 Regarding the choice equation, the ANES surveys have several seven-
point scale issue items12 on which respondents are asked to place their own 
positions and candidates’ and parties’ positions. To estimate the distance between 
the candidate (party) positions and voter ideal points, I applied the Aldrich-
McKelvey (A-M) scaling procedure to the data to defin  three-dimensional issue 
spaces. The three issue items for each of the four years are as follows13: 
1992: Government’s spending and services (spending and services), government’s 
concern about jobs and a good standard of living (jobs and standard of 
living), and defense spending 
1996: Spending and services, defense spending, and trade offs between 
environmental protection and jobs and living standards (jobs vs. 
environment) 
2000: Spending and services, jobs and standard of living, and defense spending 
                                                
12 The only exception to seven-point scale is Abortion, which is a four-point scale item. This item 
is weighted to be adjusted to a seven-point scale. 
13 Full texts of the questionnaires and codes are available in Appendix to Chapter 3. 
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2004: Spending and services, jobs and standard of living, and interventionism by 
diplomacy or military action (interventionism) 
These items are the most salient issues among the respondents in each survey 
sample. The surveys include more than three issue plac ment items applicable to 
the A-M procedure. However, inclusion of many items in the analyses leads to 
loss of many cases and thus to the empirical validity of the analysis. Furthermore, 
the procedure removes respondents who placed all candidates/parties on the same 
point on an issue. Hence it is more sensible to use only the most salient items14.  
 With respect to the salience of the issues, two different measurements are 
used. The surveys of 1996 and 2004 ask the respondents how important each issue 
is to them personally. Table 3.1 displays the aggreate magnitudes of importance 
for each issue. I compared those magnitudes to choose the three most salient 
issues.  
 
                                                
14 In the 1992 survey, only three issue items ask to place the positions of both the major 
candidates and parties as well as the respondents’ own positions. This actually decided the number 
of items included in the analyses.  
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Table 3.1. Salience of Issues, 1996 and 2004 
 1996 2004 
Government’s Spending  
and Services .708 .712 
Defense Spending .658 .689 
Job vs. Environment .663 .652 
Government’s Concern about Job  
and Good Standard of Living N/A .705 
Aid to Blacks N/A .599 
Interventionism by Diplomacy 
or Military N/A .726 
Women’s Role N/A .736 
Abortion .715 .704 
  
 In 2004, the three items most salient to the respondents includes Women’s 
Equal Role. The issue of Government’s Concern about Job and Good Standard of 
Living is actually the fourth salient issue in the 2004 NES data. However, since 
there is apparently greater misperception of candidate positions on Women's 
Equal Role, it only decreases the predictability of the model, although it may 
strengthen our argument about the heterogeneity of uncertainty. The 
predictabilities of the issues in 2004 are exhibited n Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2. Percentages of Correct Prediction by Issue Proximities, ANES 2004 
Issues & Models 
% Correctly Predicted 
All voters Voters included in the 
analysis only  
Spending & service (S) 82.5  84.1 
Job & standard of living (J) 81.7  81.3 
Women’s role (W) 73.4  74.1 
Interventionism (I) 80.4  85.0 
S+J 87.1  87.3 
S+W 81.5  81.8 
S+I 88.1  88.8 
J+W 80.1  81.0 
J+I 87.9  88.2 
W+I 79.3  79.8 
S+J+W 82.9  82.7 
 S+J+I 90.0  89.3 
S+W+I 84.3  84.4 
J+W+I 83.5  84.1 
S+J+W+I 86.6  86.5 




Table 3.3. Probit Coefficients of Issue Items for Vote Choice 2000  
   (Vote for Bush=1) 
 
Issue Model 1 Model 2 
Government’s Spending  
and Services .289 (.032)*** .195 (.052)*** 
Defense Spending .213 (.036)*** .143 (.054)** 
Government’s Concern about Job 
and Good Standard of Living .168 (.033)*** .151 (.049)** 
Aid to Blacks .108 (.032)** -.004 (.048) 
Partisanship  .464 (.047)*** 
Candidate Leadership  .720 (.085)*** 
Constant -3.479 (.262)*** -4.159 (.043)*** 
N 746 704 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
 
 For the survey of 2000 having four items applicable to this analysis, I used 
a standard probit analysis of voting choice to deci the three best predictors of 
vote choice. Table 3.3 displays the probit coefficients of issue items for vote 
choice in 2002. Whereas the coefficient for Aid to Black is smallest though 
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significant when only issue items are included as the predictors (Model 1 in Table 
3.3), it loses its statistical significance when variables other than issue items are 
considered as covariates (Model 2 in Table 3.3).  
 Other than the distance between the average perceiv d candidate/party 
positions that are normalized by the A-M procedure and the rescaled voter ideal 
points, I add partisanship and candidate leadership as covariates of the choice 
function. The seven-point scale continuum from strong Democrat (1) to strong 
Republican (7) is used as partisanship measure. And the value of candidate 
leadership is obtained by subtracting the value attached to Democratic candidate 
from the Republican candidate’s value in the four-point scale leadership question 
asking if the candidate provides strong leadership. 
 The variance equation contains two different variables under the 
assumption that the variance is the function of information and political activism. 
For political information, I use the measure that Plfrey and Poole (1987) 
developed based on the A-M scaling method. To measur  an individual level of 
political information, they developed an information index from the correlation 
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between an individual’s self-reported candidate/party positions on a seven-point 
scale and the true candidate/party position scaled by the A-M procedure. I use 
three issue items to measure the distance between th  candidates and the 
respondents themselves, so I computed the mean correlation for each respondent 
on those three issues. The higher the correlation, the more informed the individual 
is about the candidate positions.  
 Political activism is a count of the respondents’ campaign activities, 
including persuading others for vote decision, participating in meetings/ 
rallies/speeches, displaying buttons/stickers/signs, and contributing time and 
money. The operationalization of these variables is explained in the Appendix to 
this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Variability in Opinions and Voting Choices in the U.S. 1992–2004 
 
 
 The key idea underlying the proximity spatial model is that voters choose 
the candidates whose positions are closest to their own positions on various policy 
dimensions or on hypothetical predictive dimensions. But a crucial issue related to 
proximity voting is that voters have limited information and thus have difficulty 
conceptualizing the policy issues and figuring out the positions of the candidates 
for whom they vote. This issue leads the traditional deterministic spatial voting 
model to face vehement criticisms with respect to voter uncertainty. In the process 
of addressing those critiques, the spatial model has extended its elements to 
encompass elements of uncertainty.  
 However, what they have ignored is whether the uncertainty arising from 
limited information is identical across voters, given that voters have different 
levels of information. Most spatial voting models simply assume that voter 
uncertainty is an identically distributed random error. Some spatial theorists claim 
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that various information cues provide enough information about candidates for 
uninformed voters to behave as if they were informed. I argue that this 
assumption is unrealistic. In the normal electoral environment of a democracy, 
voters who have less information about the candidates may realistically have a 
wider distribution of uncertainty than those who have more information.  
 This chapter provides the preliminary observations de cribing this 
heterogeneity, which I will address in the next chapter in a unified spatial voting 
model that comprises the sources of uncertainty. Section 4.1 examines the 
positions of candidates and voters on the three issue dimensions that were most 
salient among ANES survey respondents in the 1992–2004 presidential elections. 
The Aldrich-McKelvey scaling method discussed in Chapter 3 offers a reliable 
estimation of those positions. The recovered positions demonstrate the 
characteristics of the American opinion distributions in each election year. 
However, these opinion distributions and voter perceptions of the candidates are 
not expected to be constant across all voters. Studies have revealed that the more 
and the less informed differ in their issue conceptualization and candidate 
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perceptions. Section 4.2 explores this discrepancy between more and less 
informed/active voters. Because uncertainty in spatial voting results primarily 
from difficulty in conceptualizing issues and placing candidate positions, the 
heterogeneity in these two components is surely the most significant basis for the 
heterogeneity in voter uncertainty. In Section 4.3,I present the discrepancy 
between more and less informed/active voters in their uncertainty about vote 
choices using simple calculations for correctness of voting. The findings strongly 
support my argument about the need for a voting model that accommodates this 
heterogeneity. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter with a short discussion of the 
implications of my findings regarding American voter uncertainty being 
heterogeneous across individuals and a fallacy of standard probit analysis in 
addressing this heterogeneity. I suggest a vote choice model that accommodates 





4.1 The Positions of Candidates and Voters 
 Using the Aldrich-McKelvey scaling technique, I recovered the positions 
of the two major candidates and the parties as well as the voters. The re-scaled 
estimates of the candidate/party and the voter position  on the three issues are 
presented in Tables 4.1–4.4. The distributions of the re-scaled voter ideal points 
and candidate positions are displayed in Figures 4.1–4.4. 
As expected, the positions of the candidates of the Democratic Party and 
the positions of the candidates of the Republican Prty are placed in opposite 
directions with the mean and median voter ideal points located between the two. 
However, the candidate positions tend to be in the middle of the scale rather than 
in extreme positions. Overall, the scaled positions f the voters do not appear 
significantly skewed to one side.  
 75
 
Table 4.1. Scaled Estimates of Candidate Positions on Three Policy Issues in 1992 














































Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Scaled Estimates of Candidate Positions on Three Policy Issues in 1996 













































Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.3. Scaled Estimates of Candidate Positions on Three Policy Issues in 2000 


















































Table 4.4. Scaled Estimates of Candidate Positions on Three Policy Issues in 2004 














































Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Figure 4.1. Distribution of Scaled Ideal Points and Candidate Positions, 1992 
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of Scaled Ideal Points and Candidate Positions, 1996 
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of Scaled Ideal Points and Candidate Positions, 2000 
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Figure 4.4. Distribution of Scaled Ideal Points and Candidate Positions, 2004 
 81
 With respect to the proximity between the candidates and the mean voters, 
the Democratic candidates appear to have enjoyed substantial advantages on 
foreign policy issues, including defense spending and interventionism. To a large 
degree, the average citizen tends to prefer the Democratic stand of decreasing 
defense spending. Similarly, on the interventionism di ension in 2004, the 
average citizen appears to be much closer to Kerry than to Bush, meaning that 
ordinary people prefer using diplomacy to using military force to solve 
international problems. These results show, althoug conventional wisdom 
suggests that the Republicans own these national security-related issues (Petrocik, 
1996; Petrocik et al., 2003), those issues were promoted more effectively by the 
Democratic candidates during these campaign periods. On another GOP-owned 
issue, the issue of government spending and services, the average voters were 
more neutral than they were on the foreign policy issues or other domestic issues, 
except for in 1996 when the average voters were closer to Dole than to Clinton.  
On the issues that are considered Democratic-owned, D mocratic 
candidates do not appear to have a clear advantage from jobs and standard of 
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living, but they gained tremendous support on environmental issues in 1996. The 
issue of jobs vs. environment appears to have enhanced Clinton’s evaluation 
because the average voter favors improving environmental quality over jobs. On 
the other hand, on jobs and standard of living, which has traditionally been 
believed to benefit Democrats, no Democratic candidate appears to have 
succeeded on that basis from 1992 to 2004. In particular, the voters in 2000 
tended to turn toward much more conservative positions on this issue. This may 
reflect a reaction against Clinton’s “excessive welfar -ism” (Macdonald and 
Rabinowitz 2002: 7). 
 As for the positions of the presidential candidates and their parties, while 
the candidates and their parties, as a whole, are located in similar positions, they 
show considerable gaps on some issues. Particularly in 2004, when both Kerry 
and Bush were located in much more extreme position than their parties on the 
issue of interventionism. This extremity reflects the atmosphere of 2004, which 
was polarized, especially on the issue of war on Iraq. The polarized candidate 
positions may have helped the voters remain unambiguous and more certain about 
 83
their preferences once exposed to an information source or mobilized; while, 
otherwise, remaining uninformed and uncertain.  
 So far, I have examined the general overall characte istics of American 
voters’ opinion and their perceptions of the candidates on three salient issues of 
the presidential elections in 1992-2004. Of major interest in this chapter is how 
those characteristics vary with information and political activity. I expect the 
disparity in those characteristics to result in the heterogeneity in voter uncertainty 
in the end. I examine the disparity in the following section.  
  
4.2 Heterogeneity in Public Opinion and Candidate Perceptions  
 This study assumes that different levels of information and political 
involvement cause discrepancies in voter uncertainty. I suggest that the most 
critical reason for this discrepancy is that the less informed/involved are not as 
successful as the more informed/involved in both conceptualizing their own issue 
concerns and figuring out the candidate positions. If they were unable to 
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understand the issues and uninformed about the candidate positions, voters would 
certainly have a greater uncertainty regarding their vote choices. 
 In this section, I compare the more and less informed and the more and 
less active in the two elements mentioned above: issue conceptualization and 
perceptions of candidate positions. For a simple comparison between the 
informed and the uninformed, and the more involved an the less involved, I 
divided the sample by individual levels of information and campaign activity.15 
As discussed in Chapter 3, I created the information index based on the 
correlation between the voter-reported candidate/party positions and the true 
candidate/party positions recovered by the Aldrich-McKelvey scaling method. 
The two information groups are split by the median v lue of the index. With 
respect to the level of campaign activity, the low activity group in each year 
                                                
15 The samples used in this study include only the respondents who could locate both candidates 
and both parties on all the three issue dimensions. Because of this, the overall levels of 
information and activity in this sample are expected to be higher than those in the complete 
sample. However, this does not cause any bias in the comparison between the groups. Because the 
“Don’t know” respondents who are excluded from the analysis are assumed to be neither informed 
about nor involved in politics, if all the respondets were included, the discrepancy between the 
groups would be more apparent.      
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contains those who were involved in no campaign activity except voting, whereas 
the high activity people—in addition to voting—were involved in one or more 
campaign activities. 
 
 4.2.1. Public Opinion by Information and Activism  
 One source of uncertainty in spatial voting choice is the difficulty that 
less-informed voters face in understanding the issue  and conceptualizing their 
concerns on those issues. Campbell et al., (1960) and Converse (1964) and their 
followers have revealed that voters are different in ideological conceptualization, 
which means “articulation of abstract (ideological) lines along which their 
specific political beliefs are organized” (Converse 1964: 228). According to 
Campbell et al., only full- or near-ideologues, who focus on their own ideology or 
on the party aligned by their ideological stands, can onceptualize their issue 
concerns. Evidence has suggested that more informed people than less informed 
people tend to be more polarized in their issue position  according to their 
ideological stands, and exposure to information increases and reinforces this 
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extremity of attitudes (Alvrez and Franklin 1994; Glasgow 1999; Judd and Lusk, 
1984; Linville, 1982; Linville and Jones, 1980; Sniderman et al. 1991; Tesser and 
Leone, 1977; Zaller, 1992). Whereas more informed indiv duals’ ideal points are 
distributed at more ideologically aligned locations, less informed individuals tend 
to place themselves on more moderate locations. Thi tendency reflects the 
cognitive difficulty that the less informed face and their lack of interest in the 
campaign issues.  
 
Table 4.5. Ideal Points on Spending & Services by Information and Activism,  
    1992-2004  
 
Years 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 




























Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Difference tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
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 Table 4.5 exhibits both the more and less informed an  active voters’ 
mean ideal points on spending and services, which is commonly salient among 
the ANES survey respondents in the 1992–2004 presidential elections. The 
differences in the expected values do not seem to be sufficient to claim the effect 
of information and political activism on public opinion. Only in 1992 and 2000 
were the less informed respondents’ positions different from those of the more 
informed and only in 1992 were the active different from the inactive. On all 
other issues, whose results are reported in Table 4.5-A1 through Table 4.5-A4 in 
the Appendix, the more and less informed and the more and less active are not 
really differentiated with their mean ideal points. Particularly in 2004, neither 
information nor activism appears to have changed th mean opinions among 
American voters on any issue.     
 However, because of the possibility that the mean values cancel out the 
opinions positioned in the both extremes, I also examine opinions of the more and 
less informed/active voters classified by their ideologies and see whether a higher 
level of information induces a more ideologically aigned position. . 
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Table 4.6. Ideal Points on Spending & Services by Ideology, Information and     
    Activism 
 
Years Ideology 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
1992 
























































































 Table 4.6 demonstrates the mean ideal points of the more and less 
informed/active voters on spending and services, orted by their ideology. It is 
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evident that the more informed and the more active place themselves in more 
ideologically aligned positions. With only a few exc ptions, both liberals and 
conservatives tend to be farther from the center when t ey are more informed and 
more active than when they are less so. Conservative voters show this tendency to 
a much greater degree. This result confirms the argument that the more informed 
have more ideologically conceptualized opinions. If voters cannot conceptualize 
their concerns on the issues associated with vote choice, they should obviously 
have trouble in choosing their own positions as well as perceiving candidate 
positions, and as a result, in calculating the issue proximity. Hence, heterogeneity 
in issue conceptualization is certainly a reason for inconsistency in voter 
uncertainty among individuals.  
 
 4.2.2. Variability in Candidate Positions by Information and Activism 
 As discussed above, researchers have found that less informed voters tend 
to place candidates at the midpoints of issue scale. They argue that this 
phenomenon occurs because uncertain respondents gues  rather than because they 
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have a clear perception of the candidates on those p itions. Guessing may 
generate a greater variation than informed perceptions do in individual responses 
on candidate positions. Therefore, a greater variability in perceived candidate 
positions is expected in the responses of the less informed and the less active. 
According to Franklin (1991), who models the heteroskedasticity of the 
perceptions of candidates, campaign-induced information increases or decreases 
the clarity of voter perceptions and thus engenders h terogeneity in voter 
perception.  
 Table 4.7 demonstrates the recovered positions of the two major 
candidates and the variations for less and more informed/active voters on the issue 
of spending and services.16 The recovered candidate positions do not appear to be
distinct between more informed/active and less informed/active voters. The 
candidates are perceived by all voters at nearly the same positions.  
  
 
                                                
16 The recovered candidate positions and their standard eviations for the all issues employed in 
this study are provided in Table 4.7-A1 through Table 4.7-A4 in the Appendix.   
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Table 4.7. Estimated Candidate Issue Positions on Spe ding & Services  
  by Information and Activism, 1992-2004 
     
Years Candidates 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
1992 



























































Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
F-ratio tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05   
 
 However, the variations of each candidate position on this issue are quite 
different between less and more informed voters and between less and more 
active voters. Except for Kerry’s position in 2004, the F ratios for the variances17  
                                                
17 The ratio of sample variances 2 2/x yF s s=  follows the F distribution under the hypothesis 
that 2 2x yσ σ=  
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among these heterogeneous groups are all highly significant, indicating that as 
information and political involvement decreased, variances increased. This is true 
for all three issues in each year (see Table 4.7-A1 through Table 4.7-A4 in the 
Appendix). This difference between more- and less- informed/active voters in the 
variation of the perceived candidate position is a key feature that leads the voters 
to be heterogeneous in their uncertainty regarding vote choice.  
 This voter heterogeneity in the variability of candidate perceptions is 
confirmed with a survey item presented in the 1996 ANES survey. The 1996 
ANES respondents were asked, after each seven-point placement of the candidate, 
to answer a three-point ordinal scale question design d to examine their feelings 
of uncertainty about the positions of the specific candidate: How certain are you 
of BILL CLINTON’S (BOB DOLE'S) position on this scale? Very Certain, Pretty 
Certain, or Not Very Certain? This survey item exposes a subjective uncertainty 
that the respondents feel on the candidates. I expect that different levels of 
information and political activism also induce variability in this feeling of 
uncertainty.    
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Table 4.8. Uncertainty on Positions of Clinton by Information and Activism (%),  
    1996 
 
 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 13.54 9.86 15.91 8.12 
Job vs. 
Environment 
25.00 17.25 23.86 18.83 
Defense 
Spending 
20.49 21.83 22.73 19.81 
 
 
Table 4.9. Uncertainty on Positions of Dole by Information and Activism (%),   
    1996 
 
 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 20.83 10.21 21.21 10.71 
Job vs. 
Environment 34.38 24.30 32.58 26.62 
Defense 
Spending 27.87 17.61 28.90 17.53 
 
  
 Tables 4.8 and 4.9 exhibit the proportions of the respondents who said that 
they were not very certain about the positions of Clinton and Dole, respectively. 
The respondents were spilt by the levels of information and activism on each of 
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the three issues in 1996.18 The two tables show that the more informed and the 
more politically involved felt less uncertain about candidate positions than those 
who were less informed and involved.  
 One notable thing here is that the discrepancy between different levels of 
information and activism appears more clearly for Dle’s positions than for 
Clinton’s. Researchers have found that voter uncertainty is greater for challengers 
than for incumbents (Alvrez 2001; Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Enelow and 
Hinich 1984-a). Tables 4.8 and 4.9 now reveal that t e difference in voter 
uncertainty between the heterogeneous information gr ups is also greater for the 
challenger than for the incumbent. This result imples that the inconsistency in 
uncertainty regarding vote choice would be associated more with the 




                                                
18 The marginals of all three scales are available in the Tables 4.8-A and 4.9-A in the Appendix. 
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4.3 Correctness of Vote Choice by Information and Activism 
 I have shown that issue conceptualization and variations in candidate 
perceptions vary with information and political activism. This inconsistency is 
expected to directly affect the heterogeneity of uncertainty in vote choice. I 
assume that, because more informed and involved American voters better 
conceptualize their concerns on the campaign issues and are more certain about 
the candidates, they would be able to vote more corre tly than their less informed 
and involved peers. The error variance of the voting model is expected to increase 
as more voters fail to vote correctly. If an empirical finding discloses that the 
informed and politically involved make more correct decisions, it will provide an 
empirical justification for incorporating information and political activism in the 
spatial model to explain the heterogeneity in correctn ss of voting, that is, the 
level of uncertainty of voting.  
 Tables 4.10–4.12 present the proportions of voters who voted correctly. In 
a basic spatial voting model, assuming that voters make choices based on their 
proximity calculations, correct voting simply means that a voter selects the 
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candidate whose policy positions are closest to his or her own positions. In an 
extended spatial voting model that includes non-policy considerations as 
explanatory factors, a correct voting decision means the choice which would have 
been made under informed conditions given certain information sources,19 
regardless of how the voters weight those sources. For instance, with candidate 
issue information and party cues, a vote is considered correct only if a voter voted 
for the candidate closer to himself either in the issue positions or in the partisan 
stand.  
 Table 4.10 displays the proportions of voters who voted correctly in each 
sub-sample when only issue proximity is considered. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 
illustrate the effect of additional information, or information cues, on this 
                                                
19 This concept is borrowed from Lau and Redlawsk (1997). Fundamentally, their concept is that 
it is a correct vote choice if a vote is “made of the candidate for whom the voter should vote, given 
his own political preference and the differential cndidate information to which he is exposed” 
(589). In the specific method, while Lau and Redlawsk employ the concept of the on-line type of 
information process, I do not. The authors calculate mean (summary) evaluations (preferences) of 
each candidate with the given voting criteria, and if a voter votes for the candidate with the highest 
average evaluation, they regard it as a correct vote decision. But in my study, I rely on whether the 
voters vote for the candidate that they prefer in relation to any of the voting criteria, instead of 
calculating average evaluation.    
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correctness. Table 4.11 exhibits the proportions of correct voting when 
partisanship and proximity are taken into account, a d Table 4.12 demonstrates 
those proportions with the candidate leadership cue added.  
 
Table 4.10. Correct Voting based on Issue (%) 
Year 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
1992 80.4 92.5*** 83.1 88.5* 
1996 76.7 93.7*** 79.9 89.6** 
2000 79.3 93.8*** 84.1 88.3 
2004 85.4 94.7** 81.9 93.4*** 
Difference tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
 
Table 4.11. Correct Voting Based on Issue or Party (%) 
Year 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
1992 84.9 93.7*** 85.8 91.4* 
1996 81.3 94.4*** 82.1 92.8*** 
2000 81.8 94.7*** 86.9 89.5 
2004 86.7 94.6** 82.1 94.1** 
Difference tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4.12. Correct Voting Based on Issue, Party or Candidate (%) 
 
Year 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
1992 87.2 94.6** 87.4 93.0* 
1996 84.8 95.4*** 85.9 93.8** 
2000 84.2 95.1*** 84.5 93.5** 
2004 91.7 95.4 86.4 96.5** 
Difference tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
 
 Consistent with expectation, the differences in the proportions of correct 
voting between the more and the less informed and between the more and less 
politically involved are sizeable. Except for three of twenty-four cases, all the 
differences between the heterogeneous groups are statistically significant. As for 
the relative effects of information and activism, the effect of information appears 
to be more apparent than that of activism, except for 2004 when the mobilization 
efforts played a more important role than in the other years (Holbrook, 2004; 
Jacobson, 2006). When only proximity is considered, the average difference in 
correctness of votes between the two different information groups is around 13%.  
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 Once other cues are considered in addition to proximity calculations, voter 
uncertainty is reduced to some degree among both the more and less 
informed/active. The partisanship and candidate leadership cues, however, could 
not purge the effects of information and activism. That is, despite their success in 
reducing voter uncertainty, to a certain extent, those cues could not eliminate the 
inconsistency that the different levels of information and political activity 
produced. The decreased differences between the heterog neous groups do not 
seem to be significant. This means that those with less information and the less 
involved use various information cues; but not as much as they should, to make 
informed decisions. Only the less informed in 2004 appear to successfully reduce 
their uncertainty to the same degree as the informed using the leadership cue.   
  
4.4 Discussion  
 In this chapter, I have observed that American voters are not consistent in 
their opinion about campaign issues, perceptions of the candidates, and certainty 
about their vote choices. I argue that voter heterog neity in both candidate 
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information and political activism are the most crii al factors influencing this 
inconsistency. Section 4.2 shows that the levels of inf rmation and activism 
differentiate voters in conceptualizing their own issue concerns and in the 
variability regarding candidate issue positions. The more informed and the more 
active are more likely to place themselves on ideologically-aligned positions and 
be less variable in their perceptions of the candidates. This discrepancy in their 
conceptualizations and perceptions leads a significa t proportion of voters to not 
vote in the way that well-informed voters do. Less informed and less active voters 
are more uncertain about their vote choices than more informed and more active 
voters. The findings of Section 4.3 also briefly show that additional information 
cues are insufficient to clear this heterogeneity.    
 Given the inconsistency in voter uncertainty influenced by information 
and political activism, an adequate voting model should take into account this 
heterogeneity. As discussed in Chapter 3, however, th  standard probit model has 
no room to accommodate the error variances that are inconsistent across 
individuals. The standard probit estimations simply assume that the variance of 
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the probability function of vote choice is constant. This assumption infers that all 
voters have the same level of uncertainty regarding candidates. 
 
Table 4.13. Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents, 1992-2004 





1992 1996 2000 2004 


































N 630 570 566 487 
Log Likelihood -127.741 -126.164 -102.425 -74.002 
LR Test: χ2 590.86*** 537.85*** 578.60*** 525.39*** 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
 
 Table 4.13 displays the probit estimations of vote choice in the 1992–2004 
presidential elections. The model hypothesizes that vote choice is a function of 
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issue proximity, partisanship, and voter perceptions f candidate leadership. The 
estimates of the three explanatory variables are all strongly significant in the four 
election years. However, as discussed, these estimations are expected to be 
inconsistent because the model is estimated under an unrealistic assumption 
regarding the variance, which, in reality, is not cnstant across the voters. If some 
voters are more uncertain about the candidates than others, they may not vote in 
the way that the candidates hope they will.  
 In this vein, the constant and varying error variances have different 
implications from the candidates’ strategic perspectiv s. When voter uncertainty 
is not constant across individuals, the candidates may have to find different ways 
to attract both the voters who know their strategic positions and those who do not. 
In the next chapter, using the voting choice model that incorporates my 
expectation about heteroskedasticity, I estimate the effects of information and 
activism on voter uncertainty. The estimation is expected to prove that voter 




Information Heterogeneity and Spatial Voting in the U.S. 1992–2004 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that heterogeneity in information 
and political activism is a reason for the discrepancy in issue conceptualization 
and the variability of voters’ perception of candidates. Numerous empirical 
studies have discovered that, because more informed vot rs can conceptualize 
their own issue concerns and have more consistent and precise perceptions of 
candidates, they are better able to evaluate the candid tes on the basis of their 
policy positions than their less informed peers. Many have noticed that this 
disparity between more- and less-informed voters ultimately produces different 
probabilities of candidate support among voters. In addition to this indirect effect 
of information on vote choice by conditioning the el ctoral impact of issue 
considerations, scholars of political information have also detected a wide variety 
of linear or non-linear and direct or indirect information effects in relation to vote 
choice.  
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No study, however, has been interested in an important way that 
information affects vote choice - through its influence on voter uncertainty. 
Different vote choice may be attributable not only to the different weight that 
heterogeneous voters attribute to voting criterion but also to their different 
degrees of uncertainty regarding vote choice. It is highly likely that the voters 
who are unable to conceptualize policy issues and hve inconsistent perception of 
candidates discern less clearly the differences between the candidates and thus 
have a harder time to make choice. 
The most critical reason for the scholarly indifference to the effect of 
information heterogeneity on voter uncertainty is that, as discussed earlier, studies 
on information heterogeneity and studies on voter uncertainty fall within different 
scholarly traditions. To unify these two distinct traditions, I challenge the basic 
assumption of the spatial theory that uncertainty about vote choice is randomly 
distributed and assume that information heterogeneity causes disparities in voter 
uncertainty. As I have already shown in Chapter 4, more and less informed and 
more and less active voters differ in not only opinion distribution and the 
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variation of candidate perception but also in the correctness of voting decisions. 
Because voter uncertainty is assumed to be nothing else than the error variance of 
vote choice, the disparity in correctness of vote choi e, though it is measured in a 
relatively elementary manner, strongly supports my expectations about 
heterogeneity in voter uncertainty.  
This chapter models this expectation using the heterosk dastic probit 
voting model and estimates the effect of candidate information and political 
activism on uncertainty, along with the effects of several factors explaining vote 
choice. Section 1 of this chapter estimates the proximity-based heteroskedastic 
probit voting model to test the hypothesis of heteroskedasticity in issue voting. As 
seen in the previous chapter, because information heterogeneity causes variations 
in how voters conceptualize issue concerns and perceiv  andidates, it is expected 
to have a strong effect on uncertainty in issue voting that relies only on proximity 
calculations. 
Nonetheless, empirical regularities of American voting behavior suggest 
that policy preference alone is not enough to specify lectoral choice for 
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American voters. Voters integrate various factors into their voting decisions. The 
most salient among those factors are partisanship and c ndidate characteristics, in 
addition to policy preferences. One significant implication of partisanship and 
candidate characteristics is that they are used as information cues to help voters 
make correct decisions. Partisanship provides cues for guiding preferences by 
shaping approximate attitudes toward candidates, and c didate characteristics 
help voters assess how the candidates will perform in the future. Many scholars 
argue that those cues help individuals organize and simplify complex and 
confusing political phenomena. Spatial analysts have agreed that those cues help 
people infer informed preferences and thus randomize the error variance of the 
voting choice model. However, the simple analyses in Chapter 4 show that these 
cues cannot eliminate the effect of information heterogeneity on correctness in 
voting. In fact, public opinion researchers have criticized the absence of 
compelling evidence for the effect of information cues. In Section 5.2, I estimate 
the heteroskedastic probit models with partisanship and a candidate factor, in 
addition to issue preferences as explanatory variables, and explore whether and 
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how they alleviate the effect of information heterogeneity on uncertainty in vote 
choice. The results of the heteroskedastic probit analyses in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 
are expected to warn against the pervasive assumption of equal variance in vote 
choice.  
An underlying implication of the heteroskedasticity in vote choice is that 
the heterogeneous variance may eventually lead to a difference in vote choice 
between uncertain voters and certain voters. As long as uninformed/inactive 
voters and informed/active voters differ in their uncertainty about candidate 
preference and consequently in their voting behavior, candidates cannot ignore 
this variation to win votes. It is critical for the candidates to know who are less 
uncertain and who are more so. Section 5.3 explores the predispositions of voters 
that make the voters more- or less-uncertain. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes this 





5.1. Heteroskedastic Probit Estimation: A Proximity Voting Model 
 Based on the distance between the recovered positions of candidates and 
voters, I estimate a proximity-based heteroskedastic probit voting model in this 
section. This model estimates the effect of spatial proximity on vote choice with a 
variance equation that carries information and political activism as the covariates. 
The variance function of this heteroskedastic probit model estimates the net 
effects of information and activism on voter uncertain y regarding candidate 
policy positions, whether the uncertainty is due to the difficulty of perceiving true 
candidate positions or to voters’ non-policy considerations.  
 The estimates of the heteroskedastic probit model are reported in Table 
5.1. As expected, the spatial proximities in all four years are highly significant 
and negative, indicating that the closer a voter is to a candidate’s position, the 
higher his/her probability of voting for the candidate.  
 With respect to the variance equation, information and political activism 
are statistically significant in the right direction. In all four elections, it appears 
that higher information and participation decreased uncertainty in vote choice.  
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Table 5.1. Heteroskedastic Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents, 
     1992-1996: Proximity Model 
 
 Heteroskedestic Probit Estimates  
Independent 
Variable 1992 1996 2000 2004 






































N 664 572 543 494 
Log 
Likelihood -227.727 -212.383 -198.964 -144.411 
LR Test of  
Log ( 2σ ): χ2 24.09*** 29.05*** 32.39*** 49.86*** 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Democratic candidates; 1: Republican candidates) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
 
This result implies that, as long as the voters are het rogeneous in information and 
activism, considerable portions of voters should be more uncertain about their 
preferences than others and have trouble making decisions based on the campaign 
issues. Although candidates strategically position issues and manipulate voter 
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perceptions, if voters do not vote in the way that e candidates hope they will, the 
candidates may have trouble with uncertain voters. In this vein, the impact of 
voter heterogeneity on uncertainty about issue-based voting preference will 
provide an important implication for candidates’ issue strategies. 
 The comparison of this initial observation with results from extended 
voting models in the next section can disclose whether and how the role of 
information and political activism changes as the battleground of a campaign is 
diversified to non-policy issues.  
 
5.2 Heteroskedastic Probit Estimations: Extended Voting Models 
 This section explores the effects of information and ctivism on voter 
uncertainty using the heteroskedastic probit model, but with additional covariates 
in the choice equation. With two prevalent information cues, I estimate two 
separate heteroskedastic probit models. Model 1 estimates the effects of 
partisanship, in addition to issue proximity, on vote choice, as well as the effect of 
information and activism on voter uncertainty. In Model 2, the choice equation is 
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specified by an additional covariate, candidate leadership, to see whether an 
additional cue helps eradicate the heterogeneity in voter uncertainty. 
 
Table 5.2. Heteroskedastic Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents, 
    1992 
   
Heteroskedestic Probit Estimates 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -1.621*** (0.296) 
-1.257*** 
(0.282) 
Spatial Proximity -0.162*** (0.031) 
-0.122*** 
(0.031) 
Partisanship 0.360*** (0.067) 
0.261*** 
(0.060) 
Candidate Leadership  0.523*** (0.100) 
Log ( 2σ ) 
Political Activism -0.054 (0.049) 
-0.178** 
(0.071) 
Information Index  -0.242 (0.189) 
-0.262 
(0.227) 
N 663 626 
Log Likelihood -167.017 -123.627 
LR Test of  
Log ( 2σ ): χ2 3.00 7.96* 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Clinton; 1: Bush) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
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Table 5.3. Heteroskedastic Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents, 
    1996 
   
Heteroskedestic Probit Estimates 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -1.420*** (0.207) 
-1.403*** 
(0.219) 
Spatial Proximity -0.148*** (0.027) 
-0.149*** 
(0.032) 
Partisanship 0.336*** (0.049) 
0.317*** 
(0.049) 
Candidate Leadership  0.464*** (0.103) 
Log ( 2σ ) 
Political Activism -0.178* (0.079) 
-0.167* 
(0.097) 
Information Index  -0.351* (0.172) 
-0.132 
(0.178) 
N 572 568 
Log Likelihood -143.665 -123.178 
LR Test of  
Log ( 2σ ): χ2 11.86 ** 5.00 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Clinton; 1: Dole) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
 113
Table 5.4. Heteroskedastic Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents, 
    2000 
   
Heteroskedestic Probit Estimates 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -1.595*** (0.285) 
-1.607*** 
(0.338) 
Spatial Proximity -0.125*** (0.028) 
-0.106*** 
(0.031) 
Partisanship 0.386*** (0.069) 
0.354*** 
(0.075) 
Candidate Leadership  0.618*** (0.123) 
Log ( 2σ ) 
Political Activism -0.126* (0.070) 
-0.117 
(0.092) 
Information Index  -0.354* (0.213) 
-0.265 
(0.234) 
N 540 519 
Log Likelihood -124.902 -87.711 
LR Test of  
Log ( 2σ ): χ2 8.13** 4.00 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Gore; 1: Bush) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
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Table 5.5. Heteroskedastic Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents, 
    2004 
   
Heteroskedestic Probit Estimates 
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept -1.363*** (0.337) 
-0.980** 
(0.332) 
Spatial Proximity -0.136*** (0.035) 
-0.086** 
(0.029) 
Partisanship 0.348*** (0.085) 
0.206** 
(0.075) 
Candidate Leadership  0.403*** (0.121) 
Log ( 2σ ) 
Political Activism -0.160* (0.079) 
-0.349** 
(0.143) 
Information Index  -0.423* (0.235) 
-0.519* 
(0.302) 
N 491 480 
Log Likelihood -97.965 -68.258 
LR Test of  
Log ( 2σ ): χ2 7.50* 10.81** 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Kerry; 1: Bush) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 




 Tables 5.2–5.5 demonstrate the estimates of the heteroskedastic probit 
models for the respondents of 1992 through 2004 ANES presidential election 
surveys. As expected, partisanship and candidate ledership, as well as issue 
proximity, all have highly significant influences on vote choice. American voters 
in 1992 through 2004 tended to vote not only for the candidates closer to 
themselves in issue dimensions and partisan stands, but also for the candidates 
they perceived as having better presidential characteristics.     
 Regarding the variance equation, in some years, additional cues appear to 
reduce the inconsistency in uncertainty about vote choice between the more and 
less informed/active groups. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that those cues can 
eliminate the difference. Variances of vote choice ar  generally heterogeneous 
even with further criteria that inform voters about the campaign. As expected, 
different levels of information and activism appear to be the reasons for this 
discrepancy.  
 When partisanship was considered in addition to issue positions for voting 
decisions, less informed and less active voters in 1996 through 2004 still had a 
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hard time making so-called informed decisions because of their low levels of 
information and political involvement. Only the voters in 1992 seem to have 
enjoyed a cognitive benefit from the guidance provided by their partisan 
orientations. One possible interpretation for this 1992 result is Clinton’s strategy 
emphasizing an economic recession caused by the Republican government and his 
theme of change throughout the campaign. This made voters’ perceptions of the 
national economy the dominant determinant of vote choice in 1992 (Alvarez and 
Nagler 1995). The concentration of the campaign issue on economy may have 
helped all voters detect the difference between the two parties more easily than in 
any of the other years. Because of the ease and simplicity of the salient campaign 
issue relative to the issues of the other years, even voters who were not politically 
involved or who did not have enough information about candidate issue positions 
might have figured out the main theme of the campaign on the basis of partisan 
cleavage.  
 In the other election years, partisan considerations do not appear to have 
eliminated the heterogeneity of voter uncertainty, which is generated by voter 
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disparity in both activism and information. Less informed and less involved voters 
have greater uncertainty about their voting decisions.   
 The leadership cue yields a slightly different result. Overall, the addition 
of leadership information significantly reduces variations in uncertainty across the 
electorate. The uninformed and inactive voters in 2000 appear to have overcome 
their information shortfall by depending on the lead rship cue to make correct 
vote choices. Information and activism do not have significant effects on the 
variance of vote choice in 2000, though the coeffici nts for the two variables still 
have the expected signs. The smallest, insignificant, 2χ  for the likelihood ratio 
test, confirms that uncertainty of the 2000 voters wa  not as uneven as the 
uncertainty level of other years.  
 The candidate leadership cue in other years, however, does not appear to 
completely compensate for a lack of information, particularly the kind of 
information obtained by activists. In 1992 and 1996, voters who were not 
involved in any political activity were still more uncertain than more active voters 
were; whereas, the voters with less information about the candidates appeared to 
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successfully overcome their lack of information thanks to the leadership cue. It is 
particularly interesting that the voters in 1992, who were not varied in their 
uncertainty when issue proximity and partisanship ex lain their vote choices, 
became more heterogeneous with the additional leadership cue for their different 
activity levels. These results imply that the candidate leadership cue appealed 
greatly to active voters, but not that much to inactive voters. Also in 1996, the 
addition of the leadership cue could not reduce the effect of activism on 
uncertainty. Although the likelihood ratio test forheteroskedasticity barely misses 
the critical point to be significant, the statistically significant coefficients for 
activism still show evidence of heteroskedasticity.  
 In 2004, I detect a stronger effect of information heterogeneity on 
heteroskedasticity of the voting model. When the information cue of candidate 
leadership is added in the choice equation, of the our years – only in 2004, is 
disparity in candidate information as well as political activism a reason for the 
unequal variance. The coefficients of information and ctivism are significant 
with negative signs. In addition, the2χ  for the likelihood ratio test is also highly 
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significant. One possibility for the strong impact of information heterogeneity in 
the 2004 election is that the electoral context washighly polarized particularly on 
the issue of war in Iraq and mobilization was intensely focused on partisans. As 
seen in Table 4.4, Bush and Kerry were perceived to be more extreme on the issue 
of interventionism, which is associated with the means to solve the Iraq problem. 
With the deep partisan division on these issues of international relations, both 
candidates’ strategies were to mobilize their own partisans rather than 
uncommitted voters (Jacobson 2006:16). The polarized campaign circumstances 
and these mobilization efforts may have allowed partis ns to more easily and 
clearly distinguish the candidates than in any other year. Because partisans, more 
so than apathetic, uncommitted, voters, are more likely to be activists and more 
informed, informed and active voters in 2004 were probably more certain about 
their preferences than they had been in the other years, while the uncommitted 
voters who were out of the target of the campaign might be more uncertain 
compared to the other years. Consequently, the diffrence in voter uncertainty 
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between the informed/active and the uninformed/inact ve is likely to be more 
discernible in 2004. 
 In sum, additional cues hardly exhaust the effects of information and 
activism on the uncertainty about vote choice across the electorate, even if the 
cues can reduce those effects to some degree. Although the effects vary with 
different election circumstances, it is generally true that American voters who 
have little information about candidates and who are uninvolved in campaigns 
suffer from their own uncertainty when making vote choices. The results of the 
heteroskedastic probit analysis show that additional information cues still fail to 
inform the less informed/active voters to be certain.    
 
5.3. Predictions of Uncertainty 
 I have shown that disparities among individuals in levels of information 
and political activism lead some people to be more uncertain about their 
preferences. From the candidates’ perspective, those uncertain voters make it 
difficult to expect consistent voting behavior and outcomes and thus to establish 
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campaign strategies. In certain circumstances, candid tes may need to 
differentiate their strategies for different groups.  
 This section examines which voters are predisposed to be more certain 
about their preferences and which voters are apt to be less so. For this purpose, I 
develop and test explanatory models of voter certainty. The predictors of voter 
uncertainty are then compared with those of information and political activism. As 
the lack of information and activism causes uncertainty, the predictors of 
uncertainty, information and activism, are expected to be very similar but not 
necessarily to be equivalent. Although the effects of information and activism on 
voter uncertainty in the heteroskedastic probit model are not directly compared, 
the comparison of the predictors of those variables may provide a nice way to 
compare the strength of those variables’ relationships with voter uncertainty. 
 Regarding the dependent variable of the OLS regression analysis for voter 
uncertainty, I employ the error variances of each voter’s vote choice obtained 
from the heteroskedastic probit estimations. The explanatory variables of the 
analysis include respondents’ media consumption, demographic, and some socio-
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economic status factors. The measurement of each variable is described in the 
Appendix to Chapter 5. With no existing study on the predictors of voter 
(un)certainty, I make the hypothesis, on the basis of the extant literature of 
political information and political participation, that voters more certain about 
candidate preferences are those: 
• who have higher income and educational levels, 
• who have executive or professional types of jobs (prestigious jobs), 
• who are relatively old and male,  
• who live outside the South, primarily in the Northeast, and not in  
rural areas,  
• who are neither Black nor Hispanic,  
• who are strong partisans and affiliated with organiz tions20, and 
• who watch TV news and read newspapers more frequently. 
 
                                                
20 The organizations here include labor unions, associati ns of people who do the same kinds of 
work, fraternal groups such as Lions or Kiwanis, hobby clubs or sports teams, groups working on 
political issues, community groups, and school groups.  
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Table 5.6. Prediction of Certainty: OLS Regression Analysis  
Independent 
Variable 1992 1996 2000 2004 
Income  .001 (.001) .003 (.001)* .004 (.002)** .000 (.002) 
Education .023 (.005)*** .015 (.006)** .016 (.005)** .016 (.008)* 
Partisan 
Strength .018 (.008)* .031 (.008)*** .028 (.007)*** .054 (.011)*** 
Age -.001 (.000)* -.001 (.001) -.000 (.000) -.001 (.001) 
Hispanic -.074 (.071) -.015 (.053) .002 (.032) .036 (.102) 
Black -.054 (.033) -.045(.035) -.021(.022) -.053 (.029)* 
Northeast -.041(.019)* -.019 (.020) .003 (.018) -.008 (.026) 
South -.014 (.016) -.015 (.016) -.002 (.014) -.015 (.022) 
Rural -.010 (.018) -.010 (.017) N/Ab .013 (.025) 
TV News .006 (.003)* .000(.003) .001 (.003) .006 (.004)* 
Newspaper .007 (.003)** .007 (.003)** .006 (.002)** .002 (.004)* 
Organizational 
Affiliation .040(.015)** .049 (.024)* .024 (.013)* .052 (.019)** 
Executive/ 
Professional .028 (.017)* .002 (.017) .015 (.015) .018 (.022) 
Laborer a .030 (.029) .019 (.029) -021 (.026) -.090 (.040)* 
Female .001 (.009) -.012 (.014) -.018 (.013) -.043 (.019)* 
Constant .902 (.045)*** 1.038 (.050)*** .961 (.042)*** .698(.055)*** 
N 512 523 448 440 
R-squared .169 .112 .170 .146 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
a. Occupations including Machine Operators, Assemblrs and Inspectors, Transportation and 
Material Moving Occupations, Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and Laborers 
b. This variable has been excluded in 2000, because the survey item regarding the size of place 
where the interview was conducted is not available in the 2000 telephone sample. 
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 Table 5.6 displays the results of the regression analysis of voter 
uncertainty for 1992–2004.21 Not unexpectedly, education, partisan strength, the 
media and organizational affiliation have strong effects on different levels of voter 
uncertainty regarding their preferences, with the expected signs. They all promote 
the voters’ certainty about their choices. Except for education, however, few 
socio-economic status or demographic factors appear to have much to do with the 
level of uncertainty. Household income also significantly explains voter 
uncertainty but only in two of the four years. Age, Black, living in the Northeast, 
whether the voters have more- (named executive/professional here) or less-
prestigious types of jobs (laborer here) and being female are significant only in a 
single year. Hispanic ethnicity,22 living in the South and living in rural areas are 
never associated with levels of uncertainty in all four years.  
                                                
21 For the regression results to correspond to those of information and activism, the level of 
certainty, instead of uncertainty, is selected as the dependent variable in this analysis.    
22 Because Latinos are under-represented in the NES surveys, and moreover, because the samples 
of this study only include those who successfully located the positions of the candidates and 
parties, only a few Latinos were included for this regression analysis. This may or may not bias its 
effect on (un)certainty. The Hispanic ethnicity variable is the only case of this kind of problem.  
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 Interestingly, how frequently the voters watch TV news appears to be less 
important than how frequently they read newspapers in elation to voter 
uncertainty. While the frequency of watching TV news has a significant effect on 
uncertainty in some years but not in other years, reading newspapers appears in all 
four years to strongly promote the voters’ certainty.  
Despite the variability in statistical significance of the socio-economic 
and demographic variables, the signs of the coeffici nts are generally consistent 
with expectations, with only a few exceptions. In particular, among significant 
predictors, only one coefficient – living in the Northeast in 1992 – shows an 
unexpected result. 
 Compared to the predictors of information and political activism, which 
are presented in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 respectively, as expected, the predictors 
of uncertainty appear to be a combination of the predictors of both information 
and political activism.  
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Table 5.7. Prediction of Information: OLS Regression Analysis  
Independent 
Variable 1992 1996 2000 2004 
Income  .002 (.003) .006 (.003)* .004 (.005) .003 (.003) 
Education .063 (.012)*** .057 (.013)*** .051 (.014)***  .035 (.012)** 
Partisan 
Strength .020 (.017) .050 (.019)** .045 (.020)* .034 (.016)* 
Age -.002 (.001)* -.005 (.001)*** -.004 (.001)** .000 (.001) 
Hispanic -.152 (.157) -.059 (.123) -.014 (.090) -.033 (.157) 
Black .042 (.073) -.352 (.082)*** -.101 (.060)* .041 (.045) 
Northeast .021 (.041) -.090 (.045)* .033 (.050) .034 (.039) 
South -.044 (.036) -.138 (.036)*** .043 (.038) -.060 (.034)* 
Rural -.059 (.040) -.002 (.040) N/Ab .031 (.038) 
TV News -.001 (.007) -.001 (.007) .001 (.007) -.003 (.006) 
Newspaper .013 (.006)* .011 (.006)* .007 (.007) .002 (. 06) 
Organizational 
Affiliation -.048 (.033) -.048 (.055) -.041 (.036) .008 (.029) 
Executive/ 
Professional .053 (.038) .073 (.039)* .104 (.041)** .063 (.034)* 
Laborer a .107 (.064)* -.017 (.068) -041 (.072) -.022 (.063) 
Female -.007 (.020) -.042 (.033) -.072 (.036)* -.022 (.030) 
Constant .396 (.099)*** .409 (.117)*** .422 (.116)*** .469(.085)*** 
N 512 523 448 440 
R-squared .162 .244 .166 .103 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
a. Occupations including Machine Operators, Assemblrs and Inspectors, Transportation and 
Material Moving Occupations, Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and Laborers 
b. This variable has been excluded in 2000, because the survey item regarding the size of place 
where the interview was conducted is not available in the 2000 telephone sample.
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Table 5.8.Prediction of Activism: OLS Regression Analysis  
Independent 
Variable 1992 1996 2000 2004 
Income  .008 (.011) .015 (.011) .045 (.016)** -.001 (.013) 
Education .095 (.045)*  .087 (.047)* .055 (.049) .081 (.052) 
Partisan 
Strength .140 (.062)* .218 (.068)*** .240 (.066)*** .362 (.073)*** 
Age -.003 (.004) -.002 (.004) .005 (.004) -.003 (.005) 
Hispanic -.354 (.569) -.167 (.444) -.003 (.302) .967(.703) 
Black -.369 (.266) -.105 (.294) -.000 (.202) -.454 (.203)* 
Northeast -.402 (.150)** -.087 (.164) -.040 (.169) -.175 (.177) 
South -.070 (.130) -.019 (.131) -.140 (.129) -.033 (.152) 
Rural .013 (.144) -.084 (.146) N/Ab .012 (.172) 
TV News .060 (.025)** .007 (.024) .005 (.024) .057 (.025)* 
Newspaper .040 (.022)* .049 (.022)* .057 (.022)** .010 (.025) 
Organizational 
Affiliation .497 (.122)*** .493 (.200)** .409 (.120)*** .526 (.132)*** 
Executive/ 
Professional .163 (.135) .038 (.140) -.100 (.139) -.025 (.153) 
Laborer a .095 (.231) .199 (.247) -.161 (.242) -.510 (.283)* 
Female .028 (.073) -.051 (.117) -.050 (.121) -.185 (.134) 
Constant -.357 (.282) -.853 (.422)* -.909 (.390)* -.237 (.380) 
N 512 523 448 440 
R-squared .129 .071 .127 .143 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
a. Occupations including Machine Operators, Assemblrs and Inspectors, Transportation and 
Material Moving Occupations, Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and Laborers 
b. This variable has been excluded in 2000, because the survey item regarding the size of place 
where the interview was conducted is not available in the 2000 telephone sample. 
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 However, it is of much interest that the predictors f (un)certainty are 
much more similar to the predictors of political activism than to those of 
information. Whereas the statistically significant predictors of the information 
level include more of the socio-economic and demographic variables than the 
predictors of the uncertainty level, the predictors f political activism in each year 
are almost equivalent to those of uncertainty. Particularly in 1992 and 1996, when 
political activism has a stronger influence on uncertainty than information does, 
the significant predictors of uncertainty are nearly the same as those of activism 
but dissimilar to the predictors of information. Among the consistently important 
predictors of uncertainty, education, which is signif cant only in 1992 and 1996, is 
the only one whose effect is not significant in activism. On the other hand, among 
the key predictors of uncertainty, organizational membership is never associated 
with levels of information and the media’s effects are even smaller in information 
than in uncertainty or activism.  
 In relation to the comparison of the predictors, it is notable that the 
predictors of information and those of activism are considerably different. The 
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level of information is more likely than the level of activism to be explained by 
socio-economic and demographic factors, while the lev l of activism is affected 
mostly by the strength of party identification, organizational membership, and 
exposure to the media. Partisan strength is the only variable that is almost 
consistently important for both information and activism. It is interesting that 
individuals who are affiliated with organizations are more politically active, but 
they are not better informed about the candidates than hose who are not 
associated with organizations. Similarly, when the media significantly encouraged 
political participation, it does not appear to have helped voters that much to be 
more informed. This disparity was not expected because studies have discovered 
that information promotes activism, and activism, in turn, informs the citizens, 
and as a consequence, activists are generally the mor  informed. But the 
regression analysis above shows that the sources or characteristics encouraging 
activism and improving information level are different; and the level of 
uncertainty is more likely to be related to the sources that affect political activism.   
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 To summarize, the results of the OLS regression analysis reveal that voters 
are predisposed to be more or less certain about their preferences. Voters who 
have ample resources, especially education, identify strongly with the parties, use 
the media frequently, and are well connected socially are better able to make 
certain choices. Notably, these factors influencing voters’ uncertainty are more 
similar to those affecting voters’ levels of political activism than to the factors 
affecting the level of information. Although not decisive, this result suggests that 
the disparities in voter uncertainty are attributable more to the disparities in 
activism than to disparities in information. Nevertheless, the educational level as 
the most important predictor of information is still a crucial variable that explains 
why some voters are uncertain while others are not.   
 
5.4. Discussion 
 The results of the heteroskedastic probit analysis di close that some voters 
are more uncertain than others regarding their votechoices. Although these results 
are not unexpected, they have been ignored by spatial vo ng analysts. Voter 
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heterogeneity in uncertainty, however, has important implications for spatial 
analysis, especially from the strategic candidate perspective. According to Lin et 
al. (1999), the degree of voter uncertainty is strongly related to the candidate 
strategy of convergence. They show that a large degree of voter uncertainty is a 
sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate’s xpected vote function and 
thus leads rational candidates to converge at a “minimum-sum point” at which the 
total distances from all voter ideal points are mini zed. Conversely, they argue, a 
small degree of uncertainty makes an equilibrium strategy difficult.  
 Based on this finding, an important question about candidate strategies can 
be raised: What are the candidate strategies toward voters who are heterogeneous 
in their level of uncertainty? Can the candidates have equilibrium strategies? In 
his work on a Downsian spatial model with party activism, Aldrich proposes that 
when the electorate is divided into activists and non-activists, a stable equilibrium 
exists in a single dimension along the distributions f activists, which are 
“relatively cohesive within each party but relatively divergent between parties” 
(Aldrich, 1983a: 974). Similarly, Schofield and his colleagues argue that 
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candidates’ valences generated by activists strongly affect candidates’ optimal 
positions, which are generally chosen at the locatins where activists’ 
contributions are maximized. As Miller and Schofield (2003) state, empirical 
evidence from the U.S. elections that parties do not converge to the center 
supports activist-generated equilibria. However, Schofield and his colleagues also 
notice that activist-generated equilibria are not sufficient for the vote-maximizing 
candidates to win elections, because “activists are less concerned with winning 
elections than with maintaining the ideological stance of the party” (Miller and 
Schofield 2003: 250). To enhance their short-term pos ects of winning, the 
authors argue, the candidates choose the policy positions where the incentives of 
the ordinary voters and the contributions of the activists are balanced.    
 This argument is quite relevant to the candidate’s equilibrium strategy 
toward the voters who are heterogeneous in uncertainty bout vote choice. It is 
evident that candidates have a complex optimization pr blem vis-à-vis certain and 
uncertain voters, because, as seen in Chapter 4, the uncertain voters’ preferred 
positions are different from the certain voters’ more ideologically-aligned ideal 
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points. As Downs argues (1957:95), it is more likely that candidates consider 
certain voters more important than uncertain voters b cause certain voters are 
more responsive to candidate positions and more willing to support and contribute 
their money and time to the candidates whose position  they favor. Nevertheless, 
as long as the primary purpose of the candidate is winning the election, the 
candidate cannot renounce uncertain voters even though the voters are less 
confident about their preferences and their votes ar  less predictable. How to 
balance these heterogeneous voters’ opinions in the strategic locations is a crucial 
question for the vote-maximizing candidates to win elections.   
 Data from the 1992-2004 U.S. presidential elections show that the 
equilibrium strategies of the Republican candidates w re very different from those 
of the Democratic candidates. Table 5.9 displays the distances between the 
heterogeneous groups of voters and the candidates who they voted for. 
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Table 5.9. Average Issue Distances between the Candidates and their Voters 
    By Information, Activism and Uncertainty 
 
Distances between the Republican Party’s Candidates and their Voters 
 Information Activism Uncertainty 
Year Low High No Activity 
One or 

























































Distances between the Democratic Party’s Candidates and their Voters 
 Information Activism Uncertainty 
 
Low High No Activity 
One or 

























































Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Difference of means tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
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This table simply describes how close the candidates were to each group of their 
own voters.23 The table shows that, while the positions of the Republican 
candidates were consistently closer to the positions of their certain voters than to 
those of their uncertain voters, the Democratic candidates, when taking positions, 
do not appear to have differentiated their uncertain voters from their certain 
voters. This tendency is confirmed when looking into the individual factors that 
directly affect uncertainty – information and activism. The Democratic 
candidates’ targets were still not distinguished by the level of information or 
activism, whereas the Republican candidates’ positions were consistently closer to 
the informed voters and active voters, although the mean distances from the active 
voters and those from the inactive voters were not statistically significant in two 
of the four years.  
                                                
23 This comparison may oversimplify the context around the candidates’ strategies because it 
does not include each candidate’s potential voters who were considered by the candidates when 
the strategic positions were taken but finally did not vote for that candidate. It only includes the 
voters who voted for the corresponding candidate. Nevertheless, this fact does not seem to 
significantly distort the tendency of the candidates’ position-taking from 1992 through 2004. The 
tendency is pretty consistent and clear.  
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Figure 5.1. Distance from Candidates, by Uncertainty 
 
Voters for Republican Candidate in 1992 
 Uncertain voters   Certain voters 
 
Voters for Democratic Candidate in 1992 
 Uncertain voters   Certain voters 
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Figure 5.1. Distance from Candidates, by Uncertainty, Continued 
 
Voters for Republican Candidate in 1996 
 Uncertain voters     Certain voters                      
 
 
Voters for Democratic Candidate in 1996 
 Uncertain voters     Certain voters 
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Figure 5.1. Distance from Candidates, by Uncertainty, Continued 
 
Voters for Republican Candidate in 2000 
 Uncertain voters   Certain voters 
 
 
Voters for Democratic Candidate in 2000 
 Uncertain voters   Certain voters 
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Figure 5.1. Distance from Candidates, by Uncertainty, Continued 
 
Voters for Republican Candidate in 2004 
 Uncertain voters   Certain voters 
 
   
Voters for Democratic Candidate in 2004 
 Uncertain voters   Certain voters 
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 The probability densities exhibited in Figure 5.1 also clearly illustrate the 
same tendency. These results suggest that, in 1992-2004, while the Democratic 
candidates were likely to take their positions at the locations which would please 
the certain and uncertain voters to similar degrees, th  Republican candidates 
tended to appeal more to their certain voters; that is, those who were better 
educated, more strongly affiliated with their party, associated with organizations, 
and more exposed to the media.     
 It is interesting that the Republican candidates have steadily considered the 
certain voters more important, given the findings of previous studies that the 
uncertain and certain voters have different candidate preferences according to the 
familiarity of the candidates (Alvarez 2001; Bartels 1986; Enelow and Hinich 
1984-a) but not to the candidates’ partisan affiliations. In addition, it is equally 
interesting that the Democratic candidates have not taken into consideration 
heterogeneity in voter uncertainty despite the fact the heterogeneity in uncertainty 
led to the disparities in the voters’ responses to the strategies and probably in their 
voting preferences. This finding suggests several questions to be explored in 
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further studies: What were the factors engaged in this bipartisan distinction in 
policy strategies towards the heterogeneous voters? That is, what were the 
candidates’ calculus producing these strategic position ? Does the difference 
between the two parties’ candidates in dealing withthe heterogeneous voters 
warrant the vote-maximizing positions for each candidate? Finally, how well do 
the candidates’ strategies embrace the certain and uncertain voters to be optimal?        
 Other than the equilibrium strategy, the findings of this chapter imply that 
campaign tactics and messages better be discriminated along with the various 
factors that characterize certain and uncertain groups. For better strategies and 
tactics, candidates need to precisely learn about th se factors. For example, the 
conventional perception that Hispanics are less informed or less certain was not 
verified in the OLS regression analysis of Section 5.4. Hispanic ethnicity never 
appears to have to do with the levels of information, activism or uncertainty. In 
fact, according to Abrajano (2005), who studies heterogeneity among the Latino 
electorate, it was a mistake for the 2000 presidental candidates to use 
conventional non-policy, symbolic, campaign message to appeal to all Latino 
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voters; such cues as shared ethnic identity and common language were effective 
only for the least-educated Latinos, but they do not work among more informed 
Latinos. Similarly, Nicholson et al. (2006) argue that not all Latino voters are 
uniformly swayed by symbolic approaches. The effect of symbols is strongest for 
the less informed, whereas the better informed lookt  issues as well as symbols 
when making voting decisions.  
 Scholars on American voting behavior also have revaled that informed 
voters are more likely to rely on issue positions, whereas voters with low levels of 
information rely heavily on more symbolic and less ab tract cues (Bartle, 2000; 
Goren, 1997; Hamill, Lodge and Blake, 1985; Lau andRe lawsk, 2001; 
Sniderman et al. 1991). Political activists are more integrated with politics, are 
mobilized around issues (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), and as a result, are also 
expected to depend heavily on issue preferences when they make vote choices. 
Accordingly, certain voters are more likely than uncertain voters to rely on issue 
proximity for vote choice. The fact that different groups of voters tend to use 
different voting cues suggests that candidates should be cautious in applying 
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unified campaign strategies and tactics to heterogeneous groups. Certain cues or 
campaign tactics that are highly effective for a specific group of voters may not be 
effective for the other set of voters.  
 To this point, I have discussed heterogeneity in uncertainty among 
American voters. My expectation about heteroskedasticity has been strongly 
supported by the results of the heteroskedastic probit analysis. Having found 
significant levels of heterogeneity in voter uncertain y caused by information 
and political activism, in the next chapter, I will turn to the question of how this 
heterogeneous uncertainty affects electoral choices. The answer to this question 




Electoral Consequences of Heterogeneity in Uncertainty 
 
 As the results of the heteroskedastic probit analysis in Chapter 5 
demonstrate the strong effect of information heterog neity on voter uncertainty, 
this chapter explores how this heterogeneous uncertainty affects voting decisions. 
If uncertain voters are still able to make the same decisions as certain voters, 
despite their lack of information and political invol ement, the disparity in voter 
uncertainty may not have to be the main concern of the candidates. Yet if the 
disparity leads to systematically different vote choi es, the heterogeneity in voter 
uncertainty will never be ignored by rational politicians.  
 Most spatial analysts assume that voter uncertainty is a component of 
disutility. A general agreement is that voters tend to iscount a candidate with a 
certain level of uncertainty, because voters are risk-averse. A risk-averse voter 
would choose the candidate who has more certain positions, given two candidates 
with the same expected positions (Lin et al. 2007: 10). This assumption of risk 
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aversion is inferred from a concave utility function f the distance between the 
candidate’s position and the voter’s most preferred point.   
 Enelow and Hinich (1981) formulated the negative eff ct of uncertainty on 
vote choice in a concave utility model simply by adding the component of 
uncertainty to the squared distances between the candidate’s expected positions 
and the voter’s ideal point. In this model, voter uncertainty is assumed to directly 
affect vote choice in such a way that uncertainty about a candidate’s positions 
reduces the probability that a voter will vote for the candidate. This model was 
improved later by Bartels (1986) to include the variations in uncertainty among 
individual voters as well as among candidates.  
 The heteroskedastic probit model used in this study also adopts the 
assumption of risk aversion by using a quadratic utility function. Therefore, the 
model basically presumes that uncertainty about perceptions of a candidate’s 
positions has a negative effect on vote choice. While heteroskedastic probit is not 
formulated for uncertainty to have a direct effect on vote choice, Achen (2002) 
shows that heteroskedastic probit can be transformed into a formulation of 
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homoskedastic probit, in which the component of uncertainty is an additional 
factor directly affecting the dependent variable. According to Achen, if the 
exogenous variables affect the variance in the heterosk dastic probit model, they 
are also expected to have direct effects on the depndent variable. Hence, the 
estimated effects of information and activism on the variance provide the 
theoretical basis for expecting the effects of those variables, and thus the effects 
of uncertainty, on vote choice. As information and activism are negatively related 
to uncertainty, those variables should have positive effects on the probability of 
voting for a specific candidate while uncertainty has a negative effect on the 
probability.  
 In Section 6.1, from Achen’s argument and the Enelow-Hinich 
formulation modified by Bartels, I derive a model inferring the effect of 
heterogeneous uncertainty on the probability of voting for the incumbent. With 
this model, I expect that voters’ relative uncertainty about the challenger’s 
positions lead the voters to vote for the incumbent. This expectation assumes the 
risk-averse attitudes of voters rewarding the candidate whose positions are more 
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certain. Section 6.2 explores the empirical evidence for this expectation. As 
previous studies have found that voter uncertainty is related to incumbency 
advantage, the data are anticipated to support the exp ctation that uncertain voters 
will be more likely to vote for the incumbent.  
   
6.1. A Model of Electoral Choice Under Heterogeneous Uncertainty 
 Enelow and Hinich (1981, 1984-a) extended the deterministic spatial 
model to include the component of voter uncertainty that makes candidates’ 
policy positions not points on a policy dimension but probability distributions. 
According to Enelow and Hinich (1981: 484-485; 1984-a: 123-124), the utility of 
voter i for candidate j depends on the squared distance between candidate j’s 
position perceived by voters (Pjk) and voter i’s most preferred position (Xik) on 
issue k:  
 2( ) ijjk ik
k
ji P X CU − − += ∑       (1) 
Where Cij >0 is a constant representing the non-policy value of j to voter i.  
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Because the perceived position of candidate j is a random variable rather than a 
single point, 
 j j jP π ε= +          (2) 
where jπ  is candidate j’s true position and jε  represents the distortion from 
imperfect information about the candidate’s positions.  
Then, voter i’s expected utility for candidate j is
 2( ) }{ ijjk ik
k
ji P X CEU E − +−= ∑  
          2 }) )(({ ijjk jk
k
ikX CE επ− + +−= ∑  
            2 2){( }( ) ijjk
k
ik jkX CEπ ε− + +−= ∑     ( 2 2( )jk jkE σε = ) 
            2( ) ijjk ik jk
k k
X V Cπ− − − += ∑ ∑      (3) 
where πjk and Xik denote the positions of the j
th candidate and ith voter on issue k; 
Vjk represents the variance of the distribution of j’s perceived locations on issue k. 
In the Enelow-Hinich model, this variance is allowed to vary across candidates 
and issues but not across voters. 
 In this utility model, voter i’s expected utility for candidate j depends not 
only on the squared distance between candidate j’s expected policy position and 
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voter i’s ideal point on issue k but also on the degre  of uncertainty about j’s 
position. This formulation clearly presents that the error variance depresses the 
voter’s utility for a candidate. The greater the variance of j’s perceived position is, 
the smaller voter i’s utility is for candidate j. As Bartles (1986: 709) states, this 
simplified and direct way of modeling how uncertainy affects vote choice is an 
appealing feature of the Enelow-Hinich model. However, because it assumes that 
uncertainty about a candidate is constant for all voters, uncertainty is likely to be a 
candidate’s fixed characteristic. Under this fixed degree of uncertainty about a 
candidate, it is simply assumed that all voters are more uncertain about one 
candidate than another, for instance, challengers rathe  than incumbents (Enelow 
and Hinich 1984-a: 124). As discussed in earlier chapters, this is not realistic. 
Highly informed voters and poorly informed voters may be different in their 
awareness of the challenger’s position as compared to their awareness of the 
incumbent’s position.  
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 To allow for uncertainty varying across individuals s well as across 
candidates and issues, Bartels (1986) modifies the Enelow-Hinich formulation. In 
Bartel’s model, voter i’s utility for candidate j is
 2( ) ijjk ik ijk
k k
ji X V CEU π− − − += ∑ ∑      (4) 
 In an election with two candidates, j=0, 1, voter i will vote for candidate 1 
over candidate 0, if and only if 
1 0Pr[ 0]ii iEU EU δ− + >     
where 2~ (0, )i N σδ  is i’s error in perceiving the difference of expected utilities.  
That is,   
 1Pr[ ]Vote=  
 2 21 01 1 0 0) )]( ) ( )Pr[ ( (i i ik ik i k k ik i k
k k k k
X V X VC Cπ πδ − − −< − − + − − += − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 2 21 01 1 0 0) )]( ) ( )[( (i ik ik i k k ik i k
k k k k
X V X VC Cπ π− − −− − + − − += Φ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 2 2 1 01 0 1 0 ) )](( ) ( ) ) ( ([( i ik ik k ik i k i k
k k
X X V V C Cπ π− − −− − − − += Φ ∑ ∑  (5) 
where Φ() is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the standard normal 
distribution. 
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 This equation portrays the effect of uncertainty on the probability of 
choice very conveniently by considering uncertainty to be an independent variable 
having a direct, negative effect on the probability of voting for candidate 1 over 
candidate 0. Built on a concave utility function, this model implies that voters’ 
risk-averse attitudes will reward the candidate whose positions they are less 
uncertain about, as long as the expected positions of the candidates are the same.  
 This formulation is conceptually compatible with the argument of the 
present study. By using a concave utility function implying risk aversion, the 
heteroskedastic probit model in this study infers that he degree of voter 
uncertainty affects voters’ choices in a negative dir ction. Achen (2002) 
formulates this inference from the heteroskedastic probit formulation while he 
makes a critique about the model. According to Achen, the heteroskedastic probit 
model with the choice equation ( )i ip X β= Φ  and the variance 
equation exp( )i iZ γσ = 24 is equivalent to a homoskedastic probit with explanatory 
variables / exp( )i iX Zγ . Achen shows how this is formulated (444 - 445).  
                                                
24 Where iX and iZ are vectors of covariates and β and γ are vectors of coefficients.  
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By the Taylor series expansion,  
 exp( ) 1i i iZ Zγ γσ = ≈ + , where iZ γ  is small,  




γγ ≈ − + small higher-order terms.   (6) 
Assuming that 









β β β γ
γ
−≈ + small interaction terms in1iX  and iZ .  (7) 
Given the fact that the interaction terms are difficult to detect, he argues that the 
left-hand side of this equation is “very nearly a simple linear specification in iX  








β β β γ
γ
−≈       (8) 
The interpretation of this equation is that, if thestandard deviation of the probit 
model ( iσ ) is a positive function of uncertainty (iZ γ ), then it is almost equivalent 
to have uncertainty as an independent variable with a negative sign, assuming that 
the intercept term is positive. That is,  
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 Equation 9, with a linear specification in distances and uncertainty, 
explicitly presents that uncertainty entails disutility. This equation implies that, 
assuming a positive sign of the intercept term (0β ), voters discount the candidate 
adopted as the dependent variable as a result of their uncertainty. Therefore, the 
substantive interpretation of this equation is consistent with that of equation 5 
demonstrating the negative relationship between uncertainty and vote choice.  
 Because uncertainty (iZ γ ) is nothing more than the variances of voters’ 
perceptions, from equation 5 and equation 9, the following equation is deduced: 
 Pr[ 1]Vote=  
  0
2 2
01 0 1 0 ) ](( ) ( ) ) ([( k ik k ik i k i k
k k
X X V Vβ π π β γ β−= − − − − +Φ ∑ ∑  (10) 
Where 0 0β γ >  is assumed.  
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 Empirically, studies have discovered that the candidate challenging the 
incumbent usually has greater uncertainty associated with his policy positions 
(Alvarez 2001; Enelow and Hinich 1984-a). Voters have opportunities to learn 
about the incumbent while he is in office, whereas the voters do not have enough 
time to get familiar with the challenger. Therefore, it is highly likely that the 
electorate is more certain about the incumbent thanabout the challenger. In 
addition, as Alvarez (2001: 164-165) points out, previous electoral experience and 
national prominence may interact with incumbency to help make the positions of 
the incumbent more certain.   
 The argument that voters are more certain about the incumbent or the 
better-known candidate, however, only presumes that voter uncertainty varies 
across the candidates but not across individuals. It a sumes that the electorate as a 
whole is more uncertain about the challenger than it is about the incumbent. As 
the present study has discovered that voter uncertainty is not homogeneous but 
heterogeneous across individuals, it may not be plausible to simply hypothesize 
that certain voters and uncertain voters have the same tendency of choice. There is 
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no reason to assume that certain voters are likely to vote for the incumbent over 
the challenger to the same degree to which uncertain voters vote for the 
incumbent, only because the incumbent is usually better known to the electorate.  
 As Sniderman et al. (1991) argue, the voters who are uninformed about the 
candidates would make their decisions based on whether the incumbent’s 
performance (on economy) is satisfactory, whereas more informed voters would 
vote depending on both candidates’ policy positions. Sniderman et al.’s argument 
implies that uninformed (uncertain) voters may vote f r the incumbent only if 
they approve the incumbent president’s (economic) performance, but informed 
(certain) voters may consider the incumbency of the candidate less. Consequently, 
as long as economic recession is not the dominantly salient issue, the more 
uncertain a voter is about the candidates’ positions, the more likely he or she will 
be to vote for the incumbent, all other things held constant. Because voter 
uncertainty about the candidates’ positions is most likely to result from the voter’s 
uncertainty about the challenger’s positions rather an from uncertainty about the 
incumbent’s positions (see Table 4.8 and Table 4.9), a voter’s probability of 
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voting for the incumbent is expected to depend on his uncertainty about the 
challenger. That is, as voter uncertainty about the challenger’s positions increases, 
his probability of voting for the incumbent becomes greater. Built upon this 
expectation and according to Achen’s formulation, equation 10 can be re-
formulated as follows: 
 Pr[ ]Vote incumbent=  
 0 0
2 2 ) ](( ) ( ) ) ([( inck ik chk ik iinck ichk
k k
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    (12) 
Assuming that 0 0β γ > , 0 0β < , 0γ < , and 0iinck ichkV V <− , where inc and ch 
represent the incumbent and the challenger, respectively. 
 Equation 11 and equation 12 imply that the more uncertain a voter is about 
the challenger’s positions - relative to the incumbent’s positions -, the more likely 
the voter is to vote for the incumbent, other things held constant. Practically, as 
voter uncertainty about the challenger is a result of a lack of information and 
activism, equation 12 is re-formulated as follows:  
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Pr[ ]Vote incumbent=  
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Where I i and Ai denote voter i’s levels of information and political activism, 
respectively; infoγ and actγ indicate the coefficients with negative values 
corresponding to i’s information and activism, respctively. 
 Equation 14 simply displays the negative relationship between information 
(and activism) and the probability of voting for the incumbent: the more informed 
and active a voter is, the less likely the voter is to vote for the incumbent, other 
things held constant. 
 In this section, I examined the theoretical models for the electoral 
consequences of voter uncertainty and its heterogeneity. From those theoretical 
models, I inferred a hypothetical model implying that, as a voter’s uncertainty 
about the challenger’s positions increases, his probability of voting for the 
incumbent raises. This model is consistent with the En low-Hinich model 
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modified by Bartels, and with the model formulated by Achen, in that it assumes 
risk-averse voters who prefer the candidate with more certainty associated with 
his policy positions, other things held constant. I the following section, I conduct 
empirical tests for this model.  
 
6.2. Electoral Consequences of Heterogeneous Uncertainty 
 While it is difficult to estimate the direct effect of uncertainty on vote 
choice in the heteroskedastic probit formulation, it is much easier to do it in the 
homoskedastic probit formulation. As Achen argues that hose two specifications 
are almost identical, I test the expectation about the effect of uncertainty on 
voters’ choices in the standard probit model using equation 14 displayed in the 
previous section.  
 Table 6.1 presents the results of the homoskedastic probit analysis that 
considers uncertainty - information and political activism - to be independent 
variables directly affecting vote choice.  
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Table 6.1. Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents, 1992-2004 





1992 1996 2000 2004 
















































N 626 568 518 480 
Log Likelihood -126.980 -125.532 -88.239 -68.170 
LR Test: χ2 588.33*** 536.32*** 540.32*** 527.21*** 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Democratic Candidate; 1: Republican Candidate) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
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Based on the specification of the extended model employed in Chapter 5, this 
probit model is specified by issue proximity, partisanship and candidate 
leadership in addition to information and political activism representing voter 
uncertainty25. The results correspond well to the expectation prposed by the 
model that I suggest above, although the effects of inf rmation and activism on 
vote choice appear to be statistically significant o ly in 2004. Except for the 
effects of both information and activism in 1992 and that of information in 1996, 
the signs are mostly as were expected. This means th t, if statistically significant, 
information and activism are negatively related to the probability of voting for the 
incumbent president or the vice president; that is, a lack of information and 
activism tends to increase the probability of voting for the incumbent. As 
uncertainty is a negative function of information and activism, this result implies 
that the more uncertain the voters were about the candidates, the more likely they 
were to vote for the incumbent, all other things held constant. Because uncertainty 
                                                
25 The reduced models — which are specified by issue proximity only or by proximity and 
partisanship — produce results quite similar to those exhibited in Table 6.1 (See Appendix to 
Chapter 6).  
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about the candidates is assumed to result more from uncertainty about the 
challenger than from uncertainty about the incumbent, this result also confirms the 
expectation that, the more uncertain a voter is about the challenger, the more 
likely the voter is to support the incumbent.       
 Among the exceptions, the positive effect of uncertainty on voting for the 
challenger in 1992 is worth noting. As mentioned earli r, this study excludes 
Perot voters who occupied around 20% of all voters, which may produce some 
distortion in the results. However, a more reasonable interpretation for the 
uncertain voters’ tendency to support the challenger rather than the incumbent in 
1992 may be that, as discussed in an earlier chapter, Clinton’s strategic issue 
about Bush’s failure to manage the economy motivated voters who were less 
informed about the campaign to vote for Clinton. As Sniderman et al. (1991) 
highlight, uninformed voters tend to make their vote decision depending on the 




Figure 6.1. Probabilities of Candidate Support by Uncertainty  


































 These results are confirmed in a continuum with a graphical description. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the effect of a voter’s level of uncertainty on the probability 
that the voter would support Republican presidential candidates. In this graph, the 
voter’s uncertainty about candidate preference, which is predicted by the 
heteroskedastic probit analysis, is graphed along the x-axis, and the probability of 
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voting for Republican candidates is graphed on the y-axis. To present a clear 
tendency of the relationship between uncertainty and vote choice, I rank voters’ 
uncertainty on a five-point scale and calculate the mean probabilities of the voters 
on each uncertainty scale.26 Although not monotonic, the relationship between 
uncertainty and the probabilities of candidate support generally corresponds to 
expectations. As voter uncertainty increases, voters are more likely to support 
candidates who are better known. Except for 1992, uncertain voters tended to vote 
for the incumbent president or vice president.  
 This tendency of uncertain voters to support for the better-known 
candidates is more clearly detected in a more simplified comparison between 
certain and uncertain voters. For this comparison, I dichotomize the voters by 
their levels of uncertainty predicted by the heteroskedastic probit estimation. 
Table 6.2 exhibits the probabilities that each of the two groups of voters will vote 
                                                
26 To validate the finding, the same graphical method with the ten-point scale uncertainty is 
presented in the appendix to this chapter. Although the degree of fluctuation of the mean 
probabilities of each scale is not identical, the tendency of the relationship between uncertainty 
and candidate support does not appear to be significa tly different in both graphs.    
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for the Republican candidate. The results show that the uncertain voters and the 
certain voters are systematically different in their choices. Although the difference 
in the probability between certain and uncertain voters does not appear to be 
statistically significant in 2004, the magnitudes of the probabilities maintain the 
tendency of uncertain voters’ support for the better-known candidate or the 
incumbent. 
 
Table 6.2. Probabilities of Support for Republican Candidates by Uncertainty 

















Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Test of mean difference between certain voters and uncertain voters 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.1; two-tailed tests. 
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 These empirical results support the assertion that the more uncertain a 
voter is about the candidates’ positions, the more likely the voter is to vote for the 
incumbent or the better-known candidate, all other ings held constant. Again, 
voter uncertainty about candidates is more likely to come from their uncertainty 
about the challenger’s positions than from their uncertainty about the incumbent’s 
positions. Therefore, uncertain voters’ tendency to support the incumbent reflects 
their tendency to avoid voting for the more uncertain candidate, as long as other 
considerations about the candidates do not significa tly affect their vote choices. 
  
6.3. Discussion 
 This chapter has examined the political significance of heterogeneity in 
voter uncertainty. In the first section, I discussed the models of voter uncertainty 
implying voters’ risk-averse attitudes that prompt them to avoid voting for the 
candidate with more uncertainty associated with his policy positions when policy 
considerations do not differentiate the candidates. Achen’s formulation shows that 
the heteroskedastic probit model adopted in this study also reflects the assumption 
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of risk aversion. Simply added to the components of candidate evaluation in the 
probit model, uncertainty is considered to have a direct, negative effect on vote 
choice. Deriving from Enelow and Hinich, Bartels, and Achen, I propose a model 
clearly reflecting the assumption of risk aversion. In this model, I suggest that the 
more uncertain a voter is about the challenger, the more likely he or she is to vote 
for the incumbent.  
 Section 2 of this chapter shows that this theoretical suggestion is supported 
by the NES data. The results of the homoskedastic probit model (Table 6.1), 
which is transformed from heteroskedastic probit, are the same as the results 
derived from the heteroskedastic probit model estimation (Table 6.2 and Figure 
6.1) in terms of the implication, although the homoskedastic probit estimations for 
information and activism lack statistical significances in most years.  
 One possible reason for the insignificance of the estimation of the 
homoskedastic probit model could be that uncertainty may not directly affect vote 
choice in the way that Achen or other quadratic utility models propose—as an 
additively separable factor. Rather, as many empirical esearchers have suggested 
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with respect to information effects, uncertainty may affect voting decision in a 
more indirect way by conditioning the effect of various considerations 
determining electoral choice. That is, certain voters and uncertain voters may 
differ in the degree to which they depend on specific voting cues, and this 
disparity may make voting outcomes different between c rtain and uncertain 
voters. As the empirical evidence in this chapter demonstrates that heterogeneous 
uncertainty has a significant bearing on campaign outcomes, further studies are 
expected to address the way this uncertainty affects those outcomes in more 
depth. 
 In this chapter, I have discovered that heterogeneity in uncertainty clearly 
matters for electoral outcomes. This finding has important implications for 
presidential campaigns. First, as uncertain voters avoid choosing less well-known 
candidates, the strategy of ambiguity in an attempt to make voters ambiguous 
about the candidate may not be as effective as has been anticipated. With the 
significant effect of uncertainty on vote choice, challengers are likely to have 
considerable disadvantages from voters’ relatively greater uncertainty about 
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challengers. Challengers always have double tasks. As Franklin (1991) suggests, 
because challengers’ emphasis on issues when attacking incumbents increases the 
variance in perceptions of the incumbent, while challengers have to inform voters 
about themselves, they also have to depend relatively more on attacking to 
decrease the clarity of voter perceptions of incumbents. In this vein, uncertainty is 
a critical source of the uphill task that challengers face.  
Because the impact of uncertainty depends on disparities among 
candidates in the level of voter uncertainty (Bartels 1986: 725), it is important for 
the challenger to minimize the gap between voter uncertainty about the incumbent 
and uncertainty about the challenger. In particular, as shown in Chapter 4, the 
disparity between the incumbent and the challenger is much more considerable 
among uninformed and inactive voters than among informed and active voters; 
thus, it is of critical importance for challengers to make themselves known to 
uninformed and inactive voters.  
 In relation to this, the findings confirm the need for campaign tactics to be 
separately applied to uncertain and certain voters. As uncertain voters tend to 
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focus on the incumbent, while certain voters are lik ly to depend on a comparison 
of the policy positions of both candidates, the tactics or messages to inform voters 
about the challenger’s policy positions may be lesseffective for uncertain voters 
than for certain voters. As suggested by Franklin (1991)’s empirical finding and 
Harrington, Jr. and Hess (1996)’s formal modeling on campaigning, the 
challenger who is less attractive to uncertain voters would do better to run a 
relatively more negative campaign. However, focusing on attacking opponents 
rather than informing voters about their policy positi ns may not be an efficient 
way to appeal to certain voters who want to compare the positions of candidates. 
As argued in Chapter 5, it is critical for campaigns to know which sector of the 
electorate is more (un)certain than other sectors in order to apply differentiated 





 This dissertation has examined heterogeneity in voter uncertainty among 
those voting in the U.S. presidential elections from 1992 to 2004. Using 
heteroskedastic probit models that include a component explaining uncertainty 
concerning vote choice, the study has discovered that, in contrast to the usual 
assumption of the spatial theory, voter uncertainty is not randomly distributed 
across individuals, but varies with the levels of information and political activism. 
Each empirical chapter of this dissertation provides insights into how critical it is 
for spatial voting models to account for heterogeneity in voter uncertainty.    
  
7.1.  Summary of Results 
 In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that more informed and more active American 
voters in 1992-2004 differed significantly from their l ss informed and less active 
peers in terms of issue conceptualization, variations in their perceptions of 
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candidates and "correctness" of their vote choices. More informed and more 
active voters were better able than less active and less informed voters to 
conceptualize their concerns about the campaign issues and, as a consequence, 
had more ideologically aligned opinions. In addition, more informed and more 
active voters were more certain of candidates' policy positions, and their 
perceptions of candidates varied less, than their less informed and less active 
peers. I have argued that these inconsistencies between the more informed/active 
and the less informed/active indicate heterogeneity in uncertainty about voting 
preferences. A simple comparison reveals that more informed and more active 
voters were more likely to make "correct" decisions, namely, certain choices. All 
these results suggest a voting model that addresses the uncertainty that is 
heterogeneous across voters.  
 In Chapter 5, the results of the heteroskedastic probit analysis disclose that 
voter uncertainty concerning their candidate preferences in the 1992-2004 U.S. 
presidential elections was caused by the voters’ low levels of candidate 
information and political activism. Additional information cues hardly removed 
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the effects of information and activism on the uncertainty about vote choice, even 
if those cues did reduce those effects to some extent.  
 This chapter also shows that voters are predisposed t  be more or less 
certain about their preferences. American voters in the 1992-2004 presidential 
elections who had ample resources (especially educational resources), who 
identified strongly with the parties, who used the m dia frequently and who were 
well connected socially, were better able to make certain choices than were other 
voters.  
 As information heterogeneity causes voter uncertainty to be heterogeneous 
across individulas, Chapter 6 explores the electoral consequences of this 
heterogeneous uncertainty. The theoretical and empirical analyses to explore the 
effect of uncertainty produce consistent results. A model derived from the models 
of Enelow and Hinich, Bartels, and Achen suggests that uncertain voters are likely 
to vote for the incumbent. This is because voter uncertainty comes more from 
uncertainty about the challenger’s positions than from uncertainty about the 
incumbent’s positions. This theoretical suggestion is supported by the data from 
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1996 through 2004. The empirical evidence clearly shows that, as voter 
uncertainty increases, voters are more likely to support the candidates who are 
better known or the incumbent. This disparity between certain voters and 
uncertain voters in vote choice suggests campaign strategies and tactics varying 
across voters as well as across candidates. 
 
7.2. Implications and Contributions 
 This dissertation reveals that voter uncertainty is a function of information 
about candidates and political activism. Although this finding is not surprising or 
unexpected, it has important implications for spatial analysis and studies of public 
opinion. First of all, the findings of this dissertation challenge the basic 
assumption of spatial voting theory that uncertainty - the error - in vote choice is a 
random variable following a normal distribution. Although spatial theorists 
acknowledge that some voters have more limited information than others, they do 
not presume that this limitation in information leads those less informed voters to 
be less certain than others; they often claim that voters’ low levels of information 
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are not a significant problem because uninformed voters can infer informed 
preferences from various information cues. This view runs counter to Downs, 
who significantly considered voter heterogeneity on the uncertainty scale. This 
dissertation succeeds in providing empirical evidence of information 
heterogeneity in the framework of the spatial theory of voting and thus revives 
Downs’ argument of heterogeneity in voter uncertainty.  
 By incorporating information heterogeneity, which studies of political 
information have paid attention to, into the spatial voting model, this dissertation 
unifies two different scholarly traditions. Methodologically, the heteroskedastic 
probit analysis makes this unification possible. Deviating from the conventional 
method of spatial voting, which simply assumes constant variance, this method 
directly detects heteroskedasticity of voting choice and, at the same time, 
estimates the factors that explain the heteroskedasticity. Therefore, this 
dissertation challenges the conventional spatial anlysis of voting both 
theoretically and methodologically, and its empirical findings legitimize this 
challenge. 
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 Next, the findings of this dissertation have important implications from 
strategic politicians’ perspectives. A question arising from the empirical results of 
this study can be, “What are the candidates' strategies toward voters who are 
heterogeneous in their level of uncertainty?” As I have discussed, Aldrich and 
Schofield and his colleagues show that candidates' s rategic positions are not 
convergent because of the discrepancy between active and inactive voters. 
Similarly, I notice, heterogeneous voter uncertainty s likely to make it difficult 
for candidates'/parties' strategic positions to converge toward the center. Spatial 
analysts normally presume that, the closer the candid tes' or parties' positions are 
to the ideal points of the voters located at the center of the issue space, the more 
likely it is that they can win elections (Enelow and Hinich 1984-b; Hinich 1977; 
McKelvey and Ordeshook 1982, 1990).  
 However, the results of this study raise a more complex optimization 
problem vis-à-vis certain and uncertain voters. Given that certain and uncertain 
voters differ in their perceptions and attitudes, as well as in their characteristics, 
the vote-maximizing candidates seeking positions that satisfy as many voters as 
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possible should balance those certain and uncertain voters' needs and incentives. 
Nevertheless, because they are not identically informed about candidates, are not 
equally active and differ in their responsiveness to candidates'/parties' strategies, 
certain and uncertain voters may not carry equal weight with the candidates. 
Because active and informed voters are more likely to make contributions that can 
be used to enhance the candidates' valences (Schofield and Sened 2005: 360), and 
are more likely to respond to the candidates in the way that the candidates hope 
the voters will, certain voters tend to lead candidates to be positioned around their 
ideal points. Therefore, the positions where the inc ntives of the uncertain and 
certain voters are balanced are not likely to be at the center of the entire voters.  
 The data employed in this study disclose that candidates differ in their 
positional strategies toward heterogeneous groups of voters. The positions of the 
Republican candidates in 1992-2004 were steadily closer to their certain voters, 
whereas the Democratic candidates appeared to consider their certain and 
uncertain voters to similar degrees. These results ggest that voter uncertainty, or 
information and activism, is an important element that leads candidates to be 
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adaptive, that is, to move toward stronger positions in the issue space. Differently 
from the conventional assumption in the spatial anaysis, however, those parties’ 
or candidates’ strategic positions do not seem to simply coincide with the 
electoral center. Their certain voters, who attach to the issues more strongly than 
the uncertain voters do, may not allow globally appealing positions.    
 In addition to the equilibrium strategy, the empirical results of this study 
also suggest what campaign tactics toward heterogeneous voters should be like. 
The findings that certain and uncertain voters have diff rent characteristics and 
voting behavior propose distinguished campaign tactics and cues for those voters. 
Because studies have found that voters with different levels of information rely on 
different voting cues and are swayed by different tac ical approaches, certain and 
uncertain voters are expected to respond to specific campaign cues or tactics to 
different degrees. Certain cues or campaign tactics that are effective for certain 
voters may not be useful for uncertain voters. For example, as uncertain voters 
tend to focus only on the incumbent’s performance rather than comparing the 
policy positions of the two candidates, for uncertain voters, the tactics or 
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messages to inform voters about the challenger’s policy positions may be less 
effective than attacking the incumbent’s performance. On the other hand, because 
certain voters are likely to depend on a comparison of the policy positions of both 
candidates, it is critical for challengers to make certain voters know their policy 
positions. In this vein, this study warns against campaign strategies and tactics 
that are uniformly applied to all voters without considering the voters’ different 
levels of information and activism.   
 
 Finally, the findings of this study make it possible to reach a normative 
account of the relationship between information andthe soundness of democracy. 
Given that more informed and active voters’ opinions differ significantly from 
those of their less informed and less active peers, public opinion scholars have 
shown that a lack of information and its asymmetries have a crucial bearing on 
electoral outcomes, and that they distort the representation mechanism. Because 
the more informed and active, being certain about their preferences, are better 
able to evaluate candidates based on their issue positions, or to judge the 
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appropriateness of those candidates as political leaders, and because they are 
better able to pull the candidates toward more ideologically extreme positions, 
information, activism and certainty are an important element of the citizenly ideal 
for a sound democracy. Also, from the strategic candidate perspective, voters’ 
levels of information are a critical element. As uncertainty, or a lack of 
information, decreases the probability of voting for the candidate, the findings 
suggest that providing the voters with as much information about the candidate’s 
positions as possible is a more effective strategy han strategically circulating 
ambiguous information.  
 
7.3.  Suggestions for Future Research 
 This dissertation claims that variations in voter uncertainty should be an 
important concern in the analysis of spatial voting. It is important for future 
research to reject the assumption of fully informed an  optimizing voters, and to 
incorporate voter heterogeneity in voting models in order for theory to correspond 
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with empirical observations. The heteroskedastic probit model employed in this 
study is a nice example that incorporates voter heterogeneity.  
 The model, however, contains purely electoral effects; but can possibly 
be improved to grasp dynamic interactions between heterogeneous voters and 
candidates/parties. Miller and Schofield (2003), Schofield (2003) and Schofield 
and Sened (2005) hint at a direction for this improvement. As I discussed in 
Chapter 2, these scholars propose a model that determines a voter’s utility for a 
party by activist-generated valence which is a functio  of the party’s strategic 
position, as well as the proximity between the voter and the party, and a stochastic 
error characterizing the party's exogenously determined popularity valence. 
Simply, the model implies that, when a voter is uncertain about the party’s issue 
positions, the voter may vote according to either t party’s popularity or activist-
generated valence. Because activist-generated valence r sults from the party’s 
policy response to activists' demands, uncertain voters’ utilities are now also 
associated with candidates' policy strategies, althoug  they lack information about 
the candidates’ positions.  
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 However, despite their interest in heterogeneity between average voters 
and activists, Schofield and his associates do not consider voters to be 
heterogeneously uncertain by assuming that valence terms are either randomly 
distributed (popularity valence) or constant in each election although varying 
across elections (activist valence). For them, uncertainty is homogeneously high 
or low for all voters. Given the observation that vo er uncertainty is an almost 
inherent characteristic of the electorate in democrati  societies, the voting model 
in future research may enhance its predictive power by incorporating not only 
voter uncertainty affected by voters’ personal resources such as information and 
activism but also the interaction between the heterog neous voters and candidates, 
which lead the candidates to be strategically adaptive.  
 As a matter of fact, substantial party or candidate differences persistently 
observed in the U.S. have weakened the robustness of the theory of spatial voting 
predicting policy convergence. To explain this contradiction between the theory 
and the empirical observations, some spatial analysts assume that candidates are 
incompletely informed about voter preferences (Calvert 1985; Morton 1993). 
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They show that candidates’ incomplete information causes platform divergence. 
This dissertation does not take the incompleteness of candidates’ information into 
considerations but simply assumes that candidates are perfect optimizers having 
complete information. However, if candidates are informed imperfectly and thus 
incorrectly about the preferences of certain and uncertain voters, their strategies 
may be different than when they are perfectly informed. Future research for the 
spatial voting model may provide insights into how voter uncertainty and its 
heterogeneity interact with the candidates incompletely informed about voter 
preferences and how this interaction accounts for the nature of electoral 
competition.    
 Finally, the questions of this dissertation can be explored in other 
electoral contexts from a comparative perspective to improve our understanding 
of information and its impact on spatial voting. I expect that heterogeneous voter 
uncertainty is a common phenomenon witnessed in various electoral contexts. 
Electoral context, however, is also expected to play a critical role in determining 
the level of heterogeneity in voter uncertainty andits electoral effects. Scholars 
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have revealed that the effect of information or uncertainty varies between high-
information and low-information campaigns. They have lso found that the effect 
of information heterogeneity in another county (Lin 2005). Any normative 
resolution or claim by ignoring different electoral contexts will be unrealistic. 
Future studies are expected to accumulate more knowledge about various 
electoral contexts with respect to heterogeneity in uncertainty and its political 




Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
Variables Included in the Heteroskedastic Probit Analysis 
* Dependent Variable: Vote Choice  
Who did you vote for?  
0. Democratic candidate 
1. Republican candidate 
* Partisanship 
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, 
an Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong 
Democrat/Republican or a not very strong Democrat/ Republican? Do you 
think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party o  to the Democratic 
Party? 
1. Strong Democrat  
2. Weak Democrat 
3. Independent-Democrat  
4. Independent-Independent 
5. Independent-Republican  
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6. Weak Republican  
7. Strong Republican  
 
* Candidate Leadership = Value of Republican candidate’s leadership  
     – Value of Democratic candidate’s leadership  
Think about candidate (name). In your opinion, does th  phrase 'he is 
strong leader' describe candidate (name) extremely w ll, quite well, not too 
well, or not well at all? 
1: Not well at all 
2: Not too well 
3: Quite well 
4: Extremely well 
 
* Issue Proximity  
Spending and Services  
Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in 
areas such as health and education in order to reduce spending. Other 
people feel it is important for the government to pr vide many more 
services even if it means an increase in spending.                                                                               
Where would you place yourself (candidate j or party p) on this scale? 
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1: Gov’t provide many more services, increase spending a lot 
2:                                                             
3:                                                             
4:                                                             
5:                                                             
6:                                                             
7: Gov’t provide many fewer services, reduce spending a lot  
 
Defense Spending 
Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense.  
Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased.                          
Where would you place yourself (candidate j or party p) on this scale?                              
1: Greatly decrease defense spending 
2:                                                            
3:                                                            
4:                                                            
5:                                                            
6:                                                            




Jobs and Standard of Living 
Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every 
person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the 
government should just let each person get ahead on their own.      
Where would you place yourself (candidate j or party p) on this scale?                              
1: Gov’t see to job and good standard of living 
2:                                                             
3:                                                             
4:                                                             
5:                                                             
6:                                                             
7: Gov’t let each person get ahead  
 
Jobs vs. Environment 
Some people think it is important to protect the environment even if it costs 
some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard of living. Other people think 
that protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining jobs and 
our standard of living. 










7: Jobs, standard of living more important than environment 
 
Interventionism by Diplomacy or Military Action 
Some people believe the United States should solve international problems 
by using diplomacy and other forms of international pressure and use 
military force only if absolutely necessary. Others believe diplomacy and 
pressure often fail and the U.S. must be ready to use military force.  
Where would you place yourself (candidate j or party p) on this scale? 






7: Must be ready to use military force 
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* Items for Activism (1: Yes, 0: No)  
1) We would like to find out about some of the things people do to help a 
party or a candidate win an election. During the camp ign, did you talk 
to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against 
one of the parties or candidates? 
2) Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or 
place a sign in your window or in front of your house? 
3) Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things 
like that in support of a particular candidate? 
4) Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates? 
5) During an election year people are often asked to make a contribution to 
support campaigns. Did you give money to an individual candidate 
running for public office? 
6) Did you give money to a political party during this election year? 






Appendix to Chapter 4 
 
Table 4.5-A1. Ideal Points by Information and Activism, 1992  
Issues 
Information Level Activity Level 































N 332 332 255 409 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Difference of means tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
 
Table 4.5-A2. Ideal Points by Information and Activism, 1996  
Issues 
Information Level Activity Level 































N 288 284 264 308 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Difference of means tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4.5-A3. Ideal Points by Information and Activism, 2000 
Issues 
Information Level Activity Level 































N 271 272 226 317 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Difference of means tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; two-tailed tests. 
 
Table 4.5-A4. Ideal Points by Information and Activism, 2004 
Issues 
Information Level Activity Level 































N 247 247 144 350 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 




Table 4.7-A1. Estimated Candidate Issue Positions by Information and Activism,   
  1992 
 
Issues Candidates 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 















































Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
F-ratio tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05   
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Table 4.7-A2. Estimated Candidate Issue Positions by Information and Activism,  
  1996 
 
Issues Candidates 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 














































Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
F-ratio tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05   
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Table 4.7-A3. Estimated Candidate Issue Positions by Information and Activism,  
  2000 
 
Issues Candidates 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 















































Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
F-ratio tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05   
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Table 4.7-A4. Estimated Candidate Issue Positions by Information and Activism,  
  2004 
 
Issues Candidates 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 














Job & Standard 
of Living 





























Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
F-ratio tests: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05   
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Table 4.8-A. Uncertainty on Positions of Clinton by Information and Activism (%), 
      1996 
 
Issues Scale 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 
Very certain 32.29 36.27 27.27 40.26 
Pretty certain 54.17 53.87 56.82 51.62 
Not very 
certain 13.54 9.86 15.91 8.12 
Job vs. 
Environment 
Very certain 23.96 23.59 20.08 26.95 
Pretty certain 51.04 59.15 56.06 54.22 
Not very 
certain 25.00 17.25 23.86 18.83 
Defense 
Spending 
Very certain 27.08 20.77 17.05 29.87 
Pretty certain 52.43 57.39 60.23 50.32 
Not very 
certain 20.49 21.83 22.73 19.81 
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Table 4.9-A. Uncertainty on Positions of Dole by Information and Activism (%),  
  1996 
 
Issues Scale 
Information Level Activity Level 
Low High No Activity One or More 
Spending & 
Services 
Very certain 23.61 28.52 24.24 27.60 
Pretty certain 55.56 61.27 54.55 61.69 
Not very 
certain 20.83 10.21 21.21 10.71 
Job vs. 
Environment 
Very certain 14.93 13.73 11.74 16.56 
Pretty certain 50.69 61.97 55.68 56.82 
Not very 
certain 34.38 24.30 32.58 26.62 
Defense 
Spending 
Very certain 20.56 22.18 16.35 25.65 
Pretty certain 51.57 60.21 54.75 56.82 
Not very 






Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
Variables Included in the OLS Regression Analysis  
 
* Income 
I am going to read you a list of all income categories. 
Please tell me which category best describes the toal income you had in 
1999 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, 
dividends, interest, and all other income. Please stop me when I get to your 
income category. (This variable combines data for respondents from 
households with other members age 14 and older and d ta for respondents 
who are the only member age 14 and older.) 
1. A. NONE OR LESS THAN $4,999 
………… 
22. Y. $200,000 and over 
 
* Education 
What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have 
completed? Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school 
equivalency test? What is the highest degree that you have earned? 
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1. 8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalency 
………….. 
7. Advanced degree, including LLB  
  
* Partisan Strength: recoded from the partisanship variable  
   (See Appendix to Chapter 3) 
1: Independent-Independent 
2: Independent-Democrat + Independent-Republican 
3: Weak Democrat + Weak Republican 
4: Strong Republican + Strong Democrat 
 
* Age  
What is the month, day and year of your birth? 
Age was calculated by subtracting the year of birth from 2000. For cases 
where R refused to give year of birth or year of birth was NA in the survey 
variable, a check was made of Household listing information: if age of R 






* Hispanic and Black 
What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? 
 
* Northeast and South 
Census region - interview location 
 
* Rural 
Census size of place - interview location 
 
* TV News 
How many days in the past week did you watch the natio l network news 
on TV? 
0. None  
1. One day 
2. Two days 
3. Three days 
4. Four days 
5. Five days 
6. Six days 




How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper? 
0. None  
1. One day 
2. Two days 
3. Three days 
4. Four days 
5. Five days 
6. Six days 
7. Every day 
 
* Organizational Affiliation 
Here is a list of some organizations people can belong to. There are labor 
unions, associations of people who do the same kinds of work, fraternal 
groups such as Lions or Kinterviewanis, hobby clubs or ports teams, 
groups working on political issues, community groups, and school groups. 
Of course, there are lots of other types of organizations, too. Not counting 
membership in a local church or synagogue, are you a member of any of 




* Executive/Professional  
What is/was your main occupation? What sort of work do/did you do? 
What are/were your most important activities or duties? 
1. Executive, Administrative and Managerial,  
  Professional Specialty Occupations 
0. Other occupations 
 
* Laborer 
What is/was your main occupation? What sort of work do/did you do? 
What are/were your most important activities or duties? 
1. Machine Operators, Assemblers and Inspectors,  
  Transportation and Material Moving Occupations, 
  Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers and Laborers 
0. Other occupations 
 
* Female 




Appendix to Chapter 6 
 
 
Table 6.1-A1. Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents,  





1992 1996 2000 2004 































N 664 572 542 494 
Log Likelihood -238.272 -218.686 -211.924 -161.036 
LR Test: χ2 416.73*** 355.53*** 326.28*** 360.93*** 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Democratic Candidate; 1: Republican Candidate) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; one-tailed tests. 
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Table 6.1-A2. Probit Analysis of Vote Choice of the NES Respondents,  





1992 1996 2000 2004 






































N 663 572 539 491 
Log Likelihood -167.548 -149.546 -128.111 -95.810 
LR Test: χ2 557.16*** 493.80*** 489.83*** 487.09*** 
Dependent Variable: Vote Choice (0: Democratic Candidate; 1: Republican Candidate) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 





Figure 6.1-A. Probabilities of Candidate Support by Uncertainty (10-point Scale)  
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